Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
Spring 1-1-2021

A Study on the Effect of the Mandated Change In Board
Composition on Firm Performance & Ceo Compensation
Dishant Pandya
Cleveland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Pandya, Dishant, "A Study on the Effect of the Mandated Change In Board Composition on Firm
Performance & Ceo Compensation" (2021). ETD Archive. 1290.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/1290

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in ETD Archive by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information,
please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

A STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF THE MANDATED CHANGE IN BOARD
COMPOSITION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE & CEO COMPENSATION

DISHANT PANDYA

Bachelor of Science in Business Administration

Sullivan University
December 2007

Master of Business Administration

Sullivan University

September 2008

Master of Arts in Economics

Cleveland State University
December 2012

Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

at the
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY

2021

©COPYRIGHT BY DISHANT PANDYA 2021

We hereby approve this dissertation for
DISHANT PANDYA

Candidate for the Doctor of Business Administration degree

For the Department of Finance
And
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY’S
College of Graduate Studies by

Dissertation Co-Chairperson, Dr. Wei Wang

Department & Date

Dissertation Co-Chairperson, Dr. Haigang Zhou

Department & Date

Dr. Vasillios Kosteas

Department & Date

Dr. Deborah Smith

Department & Date

Date of Defense: April 30, 2021

DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my family whose strength and support were needed

throughout this journey. This dissertation is also dedicated to my late grandfather who
wanted me to become a doctor: Grandpa, I could not become the kind of doctor that you
wanted me to be, but I will have a “Dr.” before my name. This journey would not have

been possible without the support of my beloved wife, Pragati, who never lost faith in
me. This document would not have been possible without the luck of my two daughters:

Jiera & Thisha.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank my dissertation advisor, Dr. Wei Wang, for agreeing to

serve as my advisor and showing unprecedented patience as I complete this journey. I

would like to thank Dr. Vasillios Kosteas, Dr. Deborah Smith, and Dr. Haigang Zhou for

their time and effort towards this dissertation. I would like to extend my sincerest
appreciation to Richard Routt, Dr. Oya Tukel, Dr. Rajshekhar Javalgi, Dr. Alan Reichert,

and Dr. Ian Van Deventer for their support throughout my time in the doctoral program. I

would also like to thank Spalding University, especially Dr. Randy Strickland, Dr. John
Burden, and Dr. Michelle Reiss for their continual encouragement while I finish my

dissertation. Last but not least, I would like to thank all my friends in the doctoral
program at Cleveland State University as well as my colleagues at Spalding University

for their companionship.

A STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF THE MANDATED CHANGE IN BOARD
COMPOSITION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE & CEO COMPENSATION
DISHANT PANDYA

ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine the long-run effect of the 2003 mandated change in

board composition on firm performance and CEO compensation. In the first essay, I
examine the impact of changes in firm performance to shed light on the debate between

agency and insider-knowledge theorists. Agency theorists argue that installing an

independent board would increase monitoring of management, thereby enhancing firm

performance. In contrast, the insider-knowledge hypothesis suggests that an independent
board lacks valuable insider information for effective advisory functions and, hence, is

detrimental to firm performance. In the second essay, I investigate the effect of the
mandate on CEO compensation to shed light on the debate between two agency
viewpoints: the managerial power view and the complementarity view. The former

suggests that total CEO compensation will decrease to better align CEOs’ interests with
those of shareholders. The latter argues that total CEO compensation will increase

following the mandate to compensate executives for bearing firm-specific risks inherent

in performance-based incentive packages. Using a difference-in-difference approach, I
find a positive relationship between board independence and firm performance in the first
essay, consistent with agency theory. I also find a positive relationship between board
independence and CEO compensation in the second essay, along with an increase in pay-

for-performance sensitivity, consistent with the complementarity view.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
During the first year of the twenty-first century, the corporate world faced a crisis
due to financial reporting scandals at publicly traded firms such as Enron and WorldCom.

This crisis differed from crises in the later part of the previous century in that it affected

Main Street along with Wall Street, and did so in a way that substantially decreased

confidence in the financial markets. This prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) in July 2002. With regard to the board of directors, this act requires all

publicly traded corporations to have independent audit committees. This act also held
board chairmen liable for certain managerial fraudulent actions and requires the forfeiture

of bonuses awarded to managers in case of financial restatements.
During the legislative discussions surrounding SOX, on February 13, 2002, the

Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) asked the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) to review their corporate

governance requirements for firms listed on their respective exchanges (Chhaochharia &
Grinstein, 2007). New corporate governance requirements were announced in October

2002. Following revisions and comments, the SEC approved the proposal made by these
exchanges on November 4, 2003. One of the major requirements of the new regulations
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was that all firms must have an outsider-controlled board (one with a majority of
independent directors). This dissertation examines the long-run effect of this particular
requirement on firm performance and CEO compensation for firms that had to change

board composition (non-compliant firms). The following introduction starts with a short

history of the composition of boards of directors, explains the mandate, justifies the use

of boards, explains the endogeneity concerns, describes the research methods used,
clarifies the study limitations, and summarizes the two essays.

History of Board Composition

As noted by legal scholar Gordon (2006), through the 1960s, most publicly traded
firms had boards controlled by insiders—directors who were either officers of the firm or

had affiliated business relationships with the firm. Since the collapse of Penn Central in
1976, the number of independent directors serving on boards has been on the rise. During
the takeover decade of the 1980s, outside directors were seen as saviors of management
from hostile takeover bids. In the 1990s, the shareholder value maximization principle

allowed activist investors to demand a greater majority of outside directors. Finally, in
the early decade of the new millennium, the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom,

and other companies prompted the national stock exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and
NASDAQ) to require all firms to have outsider-control boards—boards with a majority

of independent directors.
Exchange Mandate of 2003
The huge scandals of large, highly reputable firms, in particular Enron, during the

early 2000s caused enormous outrage among the public, investors, and even politicians.
In response to this uproar, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002.
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Among other things, the act requires companies to have an independent audit committee

with at least one member certified as a “financial expert.” It also makes the chairman of
the board liable for fraudulent actions of management and requires management’s
forfeiture of bonuses upon financial restatements. It is important to note that SOX does

not require a company to have an independent board.

While SOX was being discussed in Congress, the SEC asked NYSE (and its
subsidiary AMEX) and NASDAQ to review the corporate governance requirements for

publicly traded firms on their respective exchanges. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)
and Wintoki (2007) provide a brief timeline of both the passage of SOX and exchange
listings’ trading regulations. The new exchange requirements, announced in 2002 and

approved in November 2003, require companies to have a majority of independent
directors on the board. The definition used to identify an “independent director’ was also

made more stringent (see Pandya & Bathala (2013) for full criteria regarding the
independence requirement). For instance, all three exchanges require previous employees

to have a 3-year cool-off period before being declared an independent member. In

addition, independent directors’ compensation from non-board-related activities is
limited.

Impact of Board of Directors
The directors of the board are important members of any organization. They
determine the direction of the firm and provide oversight of the executive team. Using the

analogy of the US government structure, if one compares the CEO and his team to the
president and the executive branch, then the board of directors can be compared to the

legislative branch. Just as the president has to go to Congress before making major policy
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changes, so the CEO has to get approval regarding any major new projects. Similar to the

congressional approval needed by the president if changes are to be made to the
Constitution, the board also has to approve any changes the CEO wants to make to the
corporate charter. The board of directors must also approve any increase or decrease in
CEO compensation. Moreover, if the changes are not unanimous (or at least approved by

a large majority of board members), stakeholders might perceive the CEO and board
members as not agreeing. The consequences of this perception may be serious among

shareholders.
Another responsibility of the board is to monitor the CEO and their team and
ensure that they work to the benefit of the shareholders and not of themselves.

Conventional wisdom suggests that directors who also work for the firm (insiders) and
directors whose remuneration is determined by the CEO, such as those of legal counsel or

bank executives (affiliated), will side with top management on most decisions and be
sympathetic to the CEO most of the time.

From an agency perspective, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that since
management does not own the majority of shares in a company, they are likely to

consume perks at a cost to the firm. To align the interests of management with those of

shareholders, the board of directors must include members who are not affiliated with the

firm or management (outsiders or independent). Fama (1980) explains that outside
directors have to worry about their reputation in the labor market for directors. An

outside director who is sympathetic to management might not only not be reelected by
shareholders to the current firm but might also not receive many requests to join the

boards of other firms. Specifically, the supporters of the mandate argue that market forces
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alone cannot control management behavior. Regulations are needed to ensure that
outsiders are seated on the board who will effectively monitor management.

Shareholders of companies that maintained insider-controlled boards must have

had some reasons for doing so. The primary reason is that insiders and affiliated directors
bring firm-specific or area-specific knowledge that a CEO needs to make decisions. The

opponents of this mandate argue that the new regulation would unnecessarily burden

firms and increase the costs associated with the mandate. Firms previously resisted the
change to boards composed of a majority of outsiders because it was optimal for them to

have done so.
Endogeneity
Endogeneity in board studies is a common issue. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)

explain that, in most cases, the board is endogenously chosen. For instance, Hermalin and
Weisbach (1988) showed that board independence increases after poor performance. It is

highly possible that board independence was not the only change that occurred, and many
other changes (such as CEO replacement, reductions in workforce, and spin-off of a
section of the firm) occurred simultaneously. This leads to an endogeneity problem in

determining the effectiveness of board composition. It is quite difficult to distinguish
between the effects of board independence alone and the effects of these other changes.
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) posit that the best way to avoid this pitfall is to
look for “natural experiments” such as the passage of new laws and regulations.

Roberts and Whited (2013) claim that the difference-in-difference (DD) estimator
provides an unbiased and consistent estimation for a natural experiment. Thus, in this

study, I use DD estimation to avoid endogeneity concerns.
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AFt = ft1 Insider Controlled Board Dummy-2000 + p2Post Regulation +
P3Insider Dummy x Regulation + ftiX^ + Et

(1)

In the above equation, AF is the affected factor, the dependent variable that

measures either firm performance or CEO compensation in a given year, as discussed in
Chapters II and III, respectively. If a firm has a majority of insiders on the board at the

end of fiscal year 2000 (non-compliant firms), the first independent variable is equal to 1;
otherwise, it is 0 (compliant firms—those firms that do not have to change the board

structure). Similarly, for the years following 2001, the year when the mandate that
required a publicly traded company to have a majority of independent board members

started gaining momentum, Post Regulation will equal 1; otherwise, it is 0. X denotes the

control variables and the fixed effects used in the equation.

The difference-in-difference (DD) estimator, ^3, is the interaction term between
the board dummy and regulation dummy. The DD estimator captures the long-run
variation experienced by firms whose boards had to restructure to follow the new rules

compared to a scenario in which there was no mandate by estimating the average
differential in firm performance or CEO compensation for non-compliant firms following
the mandate relative to the average differential for compliant firms. If the regulations had

no effect on the affected variable, then the difference would be expected to be
insignificant.1 However, if the difference is significantly positive, that would indicate that
the new rules increased relative firm performance and relative total CEO compensation.

On the other hand, if the difference is significantly negative, then relative firm
performance and relative total CEO compensation decreased in the long run.

1 The so-called window-dressing view as proposed by Romano (2005).
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Limitations
This study has three limitations. Since SOX and board independence mandates
were announced around the same time, it is difficult to separate their individual effects. It

can be argued that in the absence of the board independence mandate, firms would have

switched to independent boards as a result of SOX regulations. Legally speaking,
however, a company can have an 11-member board with only 3 financially competent
independent directors (only 1 of whom could be a “financial expert”). Since three board
members are a standard audit committee, these three could be the only independent
members while still complying with the rules of SOX. Even so, as shown by Guo,
Mobbs, and Lach (2015), firms that had a low compliance rate for SOX also had a low

compliance rate for the mandate. Nonetheless, the only way to separate out the SOX
effect would be to look at the composition of committees affected by SOX for each firm,

which is not possible at this time given the data available.
In this study, all directors were grouped into two categories: insiders or outsiders.

This is consistent with previous studies focusing on the impact of board independence as
well as group dynamic studies, indicating that individuals vote with their groups. One can

argue, however, that individual directors may make decisions and vote against the group

under certain circumstances (see Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) and Adams et al. (2010)
for examples). Thus, the impact of board independence mandates may be understated or

overstated. Again, given the data available, it was not possible to separate these groups.

As with any long-term study, there is always concern that survivorship bias may
exemplify the impact of board independence, as companies that survive during the data

period may not be representative of the population. To eliminate this bias, I use the
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Heckman 2-step procedure, and the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in
the next two chapters. They are available upon request. Even after using this procedure, it

is not possible to completely eliminate survivorship bias.

Two Essays
The first essay examines the effect of the passage of an exchange-listed mandate
requiring a majority of independent directors on the company’s board on long-term firm

performance. Agency theorists argue that a strong monitoring mechanism is needed to
provide the necessary oversight of executives, who tend to be opportunistic and self
serving (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). They contend that installing an independent board will
increase management monitoring and thereby enhance firm performance. Insider

knowledge theorists do not dispute that the agency problem needs to be addressed, but
they believe an insider-control board, with its focus on advising, is better suited to take
advantage of firm-specific knowledge. Harris and Raviv (2008) claim that an independent

board lacks valuable insider information, which prevents effective advising and, hence, is

detrimental to firm performance.
I hypothesize that the direction of firm performance depends on the firm’s

monitoring and advisory needs. Board composition is a function of balancing the

advisory and monitoring roles of the board. However, the increase in the monitoring role,
resulting from board control by the majority of independent directors, comes at the cost

of the board’s advisory role. If the firm needs the monitoring function of the board more
than the advisory function, forcing the adoption of an outsider-control board creates

value. Conversely, if the firm needs the advisory function of the board more than the
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monitoring function, then increasing the monitoring function of the board would be

detrimental to firm performance.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, I find a positive relationship between

board independence and firm performance, consistent with agency theory. I also conduct
subsample analyses to corroborate these findings, finding that the positive impact of the

mandate was concentrated in utility and small firms. On the other hand, research-oriented

firms suffered from a change in their board composition when they complied with this
mandate.
In the second essay, I investigate the effect of the 2003 mandated change in board

composition on CEO compensation. Agency theory argues that outside directors will
implement greater pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEOs’ compensation packages to
align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 2010). Consistent

with this hypothesis, I find that pay-for-performance sensitivity increased following the
mandate. However, it is possible to argue that, as a result of employing greater pay-for-

performance sensitivity, total CEO compensation either increases or decreases in the long

run.

Under the managerial power view, CEOs have too much influence over inside
board members, and as a consequence have too much influence over their own

compensation packages (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997). Proponents of the mandate

argue that CEOs are able to extract rent from their firms, allowing management to secure
generous monetary gains even when their company’s performance is deficient (Bebchuk
& Fried, 2005). As a result, the mandate leads to a reduction in total CEO compensation.
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Under the complementarity view, as described by Fahlenbrach (2009),

governance mechanisms and pay-for-performance contracts complement one another.
Opponents of the mandate believe that the current level of CEO compensation is at an

equilibrium point in the market for talented CEOs. Due to the increased incentives, CEOs
lose the ability to invest their income elsewhere in the market and diversify their

investments. As a result of bearing additional firm-specific risks, it is thus necessary to
increase the total compensation for CEOs.
Using the difference-in-difference methodology, I find that total CEO

compensation increased for firms that were not compliant, indicating that independent

boards had to pay more. Additional results from exploring the compensation components
responsible for the increase align with the complementarity view, indicating that while

firms increased total compensation, that change was through equity compensation and not

through cash compensation awarded to CEOs.
Summary

Following the scandals of the early 21st century, regulators decided that much

stronger corporate governance was needed to protect shareholders from CEOs and their

management. As a result, AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE require publicly traded firms to
change board composition from insider-control to outsider-control (one with a majority

of independent directors). This dissertation examines the long-run effect of this mandate
on non-compliant firms via changes in firm performance and CEO compensation.
The results indicate a differential impact on the performance and CEO

compensation of insider-control firms following the mandate. The majority of the test
results of the first essay are consistent with agency theory. Firms forced to change their
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board composition experienced a long-run increase in firm performance. In the second
essay, which is also consistent with agency theory, I find that pay-for-performance

sensitivity increased. However, despite agency theorists’ efforts to reduce CEO
compensation, the exchange mandate resulted in an increase in total CEO compensation.

This suggests that new independent boards felt that an increase in total CEO

compensation was worth the cost to produce increases in long-run firm performance.
The contributions to the literature are as follows: First, this is the first study to
compare the long-run effects on traditionally insider-control boards after the mandate was
passed by NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Second, comparing the short-run results of

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007, 2009) with the long-term results found here should

allow the determination of investors’ immediate reactions as well as long-run
observations. Finally, the results and conclusions of this research should shed light on the

long-standing debate regarding the effects of having independent boards or insider
boards, suggesting policy implications.
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CHAPTER II

ESSAY 1: INSIDER KNOWELDGE VS OUTSIDER OVERSIGHT: A STUDY ON
THE EFFECTS OF BOARD COMPOSITION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE

Introduction
The primary duties of the board of directors include monitoring and advising top
management (Mace, 1971). The monitoring role of the board consists of selecting the

appropriate management and evaluate its performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). In
the advisory role, the board guides management in establishing the strategic direction of
the firm (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Agency theorists and insider knowledge theorists

have long speculated about which role is more important in maximizing shareholder

wealth.
Agency theorists argue that a strong monitoring mechanism is needed to provide
the necessary oversight of executives, who tend to be opportunistic and self-serving

(Bebchuk & Fried, 2005; Fan, 2004). An outsider-control board (a board with a majority

of independent directors) will add the essential supervision needed to better align
management actions with shareholder interests.

Insider-knowledge theorists do not dispute that the agency problem needs to be
addressed, but they believe an insider-control board (a board with a majority of
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management-affiliated directors) is better suited to take advantage of firm-specific

knowledge (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Harris & Raviv, 2008). An insider-control board

provides a strong advisory mechanism to assist management in making decisions that
maximize shareholder wealth.
In November 2003, following the accounting scandals at Enron, Tyco,

WorldCom, and other companies, as well as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX), the national stock exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ), under the
guidance of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), mandated that all firms

have outsider-control boards. The monitoring function of boards increased with

independent directors responsible for evaluating management performance, determining
management salaries, and ensuring the integrity of the audit process (Chhaochharia &

Grinstein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007). The goal of this study is to determine the impact of the
mandated changes on board composition and the increased monitoring functions on firm

performance.
I hypothesize that the direction of firm performance depended on the firm’s

monitoring and advisory needs. As a result of the mandate, boards became outsider-

controlled and exerted increased monitoring power. Firms that needed more oversight

would effectively mitigate agency problems, experiencing a positive effect on firm

performance. However, as independent directors are added to the board to form the
mandated majority, firm-specific knowledge possessed by inside directors will be

marginalized, resulting in diminished strategic advising (Harris & Raviv, 2008). Firms
that needed more advising would experience a negative effect on firm performance

resulting from a switch to an outsider-control board.
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To test the impact of the forced change in board composition on firm performance

(measured by operating return on assets), I analyzed the data from 1997 to 2012 while
controlling for industry and year fixed effects, book leverage, book-to-market ratio, and

total assets. Using the difference-in-difference methodology, similar to Chhaochharia and
Grinstein (2009), Duchin et al. (2010), Guo, Lach, and Mobbs (2015), Chung and John

(2017), and Lu and Wang (2018), I segregated the changes in performance due to the
exogenous shock by taking the difference in the changes in the performance of the

insider-control firms (non-compliant firms) and outsider-control firms (compliant firms),
thereby reducing endogeneity concerns.

My findings indicate that, overall, long-run performance increased for firms that
needed to change their board composition, consistent with agency theory. The magnitude

of the increase in operating return was between 0.75% and 0.86% at the 10% significance
level. Economically, there was an increase in the relative return on assets of noncompliant firms of at least three-quarters of a percentage point annually compared to
compliant firms following the mandate. This long-run result following the mandate has
not been previously identified in the literature. The dependent variable is plotted both

pre- and post-mandate to confirm that the parallel trend assumption holds. The

falsification test shows that the main result is not a delayed reaction of the exchange
mandates announced prior to 2003. I also confirmed the main result via the propensity
score matching methodology, using return on sales as an alternative way to measure firm

performance. The main result holds even after controlling for unobserved firm fixed
effects.
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The overall positive, but only weakly significant, impact found on firm
performance may conceal potential cross-sectional variations in the relationship between

board composition and firm performance. My second hypothesis is that the mandate did
not affect all firms equally because the increase in the monitoring role resulting from a

board controlled by a majority of independent directors came at the cost of the advisory
role of the board. For the sub-sample hypotheses, I study the impact of the mandate on
utility firms, small firms, and research-oriented firms.

Utility firms have less need for advice because they face profit maximization

constraints due to their monopoly position (Vinod & Geddes, 2002). Additionally,
according to Hirschey and Pappas (1981), regulations on utility firms create barriers to
entry, resulting in market power that can be exploited by management to serve its own
purposes. Improved monitoring is needed for utility firms to address agency problems
resulting from entrenched management. Since there is less need for the advisory role of

the board, the mandate will have a positive effect on the long-run performance of non-

compliant utility firms.

For small firms, independent boards focus on monitoring strategies to evaluate
management and advisory strategies to improve efficiency. According to Dalton et al.

(1998), small firms are less complex, which makes it easier for new independent directors
to become sufficiently familiar with the firm to provide advice as needed, as well as
making it easier for an outside board to gather information to monitor management and
evaluate firm performance. Since there is no loss in the advisory role of the board, the

mandate will have a positive effect on the long-run performance of non-compliant small
firms.
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For research-oriented firms, the advisory role of the board depends on the
directors’ ability to understand the complexity of the research projects that firms are
pursuing. Outside boards do not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge to properly

advise management (Coles et al. 2008; Duchin et al, 2010). Eventually, non-compliant
research-intensive firms that change board composition will experience a decrease in

performance due to a loss of market share to new innovators.
In the sub-sample examinations, I found differential impacts of the mandate on

firm performance, such that the positive relationship between board independence and
performance was more prominent among non-compliant utilities and small firms. Non-

compliant firms with heavy investment in R&D showed a less pronounced impact on

firm performance following the mandate.
This study belongs to the body of literature that focuses on changes in board

composition following the 2003 stock-exchange mandate. Chhaochharia and Grinstein

(2007) found significantly positive announcement returns for firms that changed their
board composition. Wintoki (2007) showed that positive announcement returns were
related to firm size and age, but found negative announcement returns for growing firms.

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) noted that compensation decreased for CEOs at
companies affected by the mandate. Duchin et al. (2010) showed that the benefit of an

outside board depends on the level of information asymmetry between management and

independent directors. Guo et al. (2015) found that additional monitoring provided by an
independent board substituted for external corporate governance mechanisms. Chung and
John (2017) asserted that CEO compensation was less dependent on firm performance

following the mandate. Lu and Wang (2018) discovered a positive relationship between
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board independence and corporate innovation. Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso (2017)

observed that new independent boards prefer to exploit existing efficiencies rather than
explore new opportunities. Unlike these studies, I examined the effect of the mandate on

long-run firm performance. My contribution to this body of literature is in finding that the
exchange mandate had an overall positive long-term effect on firm performance, but that

cross-sectional variations among different firms was obscured.
This study extends the literature on board composition and has the potential to

reconcile agency theory and insider-knowledge theory. For firms in which a monitoring
role is more important, outsider-control boards are beneficial to firm performance. For
firms in which an advisory role is more important, outsider-control boards are detrimental
to firm performance. I make an essential practical contribution by providing evidence that
an outsider-control board is not appropriate for all companies.
Section II of this paper is a brief review of the literature. Section III discusses the
hypotheses. Section IV describes the data, variables, and summary statistics. Section V

explains the models and their use and conducts univariate analyses. The full sample

results are presented in Section VI. Section VII conducts robustness tests. Section VIII

presents the subsample tests. Section IX concludes.
Literature Review
In this section, I begin by describing a brief history of the changes in board

composition. I then examine the relationship between board composition and firm

performance in accordance with agency theory and insider-knowledge theory and review

research conducted prior to the board-independence mandate. I conclude this section by
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examining current research on the impact of the board-independence mandate on firm
performance.

History of Board Composition. Through the 1960s, most publicly traded firms

had insider-control boards (Gordon, 2006). Since the collapse of Penn Central in 1976,
the number of independent (outside) directors serving on boards has been on the rise.

During the takeover decade of the 1980s, outside directors were seen as saviors of
management from hostile takeover bids, while in the 1990s, the shareholder value

maximization principle allowed activist investors to demand a greater majority of outside
(independent) directors on the board. Finally, in the early decade of the new millennium,

the accounting scandals at Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom prompted the national stock
exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ) to require all firms to have outsider-control

boards. Without evidence that increasing the number of independent directors serving on
the board would negatively affect firm performance, outsider-control boards looked like
the way forward.

Independent Board Research. Previous empirical studies of the impact of outside

board members on firm performance have not provided conclusive results (see Hermalin
& Weisbach, 2003; Fan, 2004). For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and

Weisbach (1991), and Bhagat and Black (2002) found no relationship between board
independence and firms’ financial performance over the long run.

There are two reasons for these findings. First, these studies do not adequately
control for board composition, which is endogenously chosen according to the needs of
the firm. Endogenous decisions, such as having either a majority of insiders or outsiders

on the boards, are correlated with other firm-specific characteristics. These decisions
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require an external force or shock (treatment) to measure their effects on firm

performance. An external force, such as the independent board mandate of 2003, controls
for endogeneity concerns and provides an answer regarding the impact of board
independence on firm performance. Another reason for these findings is likely due to the

simultaneous study of all firms. Examining sub-sample data allows the determination of

whether the impact is similar across all firms. A one-size-fits-all model regarding board
regulation might not be appropriate for all companies.

Agency Literature. Conventional wisdom suggests that increasing the number of

independent board members will lead to an increase in firm performance. This belief is
due to the popularity of agency theory, which calls for increased monitoring and

oversight of management by outsiders to improve performance. A key tenet of agency
theory is that management tends to be opportunistic and self-serving, requiring strong

oversight (Fan, 2004), and that insiders are poor monitors because CEOs have too much
influence over inside board members (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997). Bathala and Rao

(1995) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) contended that by increasing the number of
independent directors on the board, companies can reduce the CEO’s influence over the
board and decrease agency costs.
Fama (1980) argued that outside directors want to be impartial. Favoring
management would tarnish their reputations in the labor market because most outside

directors serve on more than one board. Additionally, there is a high probability that they

would not be elected again at the same firm. Moreover, provisions in SOX and the
mandate allow board members to be held responsible for failing to identify certain
management actions (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). My study provides evidence of
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the impact of outsider-control boards on firm performance and answers lingering
questions.

Insider Knowledge Literature. Insider knowledge theorists argue that the

advisory role of the board is more important than its monitoring role (Harris & Raviv,

2008). An outside board member is, by definition, someone who has had no or very
limited business dealings with the firm. Due to the fear of losing competitive advantage

and a perceived or real conflict of interest, independent directors are generally not

employed as executives of other firms in the same industry (e.g. Adams (2012) for post
mandate board composition in financial firms). Thus, it might be difficult to find

someone outside the industry who can gain a full understanding of the firm and its
industry.

As a result, greater independence may not be beneficial because a more
independent board may not have sufficient technical expertise and industry-specific
knowledge to advise management. Consequently, this would increase the cost of the
increased monitoring resulting from a new independent board. Since outside board

members do not have enough firm-specific knowledge to be effective advisors, new

independent boards will decrease firm performance (Harris & Raviv, 2008). This study
provides evidence of cases in which outsider-control boards are detrimental to firm
performance.

Board Composition and Firm Performance after 2003. Lee and Carson (2007),
in a univariate setting, found a significant difference in operating performance for firms
with outsider-board majorities (greater than 75%), suggesting that the required change in
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board composition will benefit shareholders. The study failed to perform a multivariate
analysis to determine whether board composition has an impact on firm performance.

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) studied the effect of an exchange mandate
announcement on firm value, finding that insider-control firms earned positive abnormal
returns compared to outsider-control firms during the announcement period. This is not
surprising because there is much empirical evidence that changing the board composition
indicates a new strategic direction of the firm, leading to positive short-run market gains
(see Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Gordon, 2007; Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010).

Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), however, argued that these short-run gains do not

necessarily extend into the long term; an announcement impact may be the result of the
change itself. It is necessary to study whether this change has a positive impact in the

long term.
Furthermore, when separating firms by size, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)

find that smaller firms did not earn positive abnormal announcement returns and, in some
cases, earned negative returns during the announcement period. Similarly, Wintoki

(2007) studied the effect of exchange mandate announcements on firm performance and

found positive effects for large and older firms, but negative effects for growing firms.
Neither Wintoki (2007) nor Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) looked at the effect of the

mandate on firm performance over the long run.

Bhagat and Bolton (2013) are among the few researchers to find a negative effect

of insider-control boards on firm performance before the mandate, but they found a
positive effect of insider-control boards on firm performance after the mandate by

separating their data into pre and post-2002 sub-periods. More data are needed to
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determine whether the post-2002 results could be sustained over a longer period. The
study also lacked a cross-sectional analysis to determine whether the effects were the

same for all firms.

It is important to consider other factors that could impact firm performance in the
2002 exchange mandate. Therefore, a study using multivariate analysis is needed. Some

studies have identified short-run positive results, but it is not known whether positive

short-run results can be sustained. A study that considers firm performance over a longer
period is required. It is also important to perform a subsample analysis of different types

of firms to determine whether only some or all companies benefited from the exchange
mandate. My study addresses all these concerns.

Research Hypotheses
As a response to the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco scandals of the early 2000s,
government officials through the SEC and stock exchanges sided with agency theorists
and imposed tougher oversight rules on publicly traded companies. Agency theory posits
that adding outside board members will increase firm performance by improving the
monitoring function and mitigating agency costs. In contrast, insider knowledge theory

argues that adding outside directors will result in a loss of firm-specific knowledge from
the board and impair its advisory function, negatively affecting firm performance. What

was the effect of the new board composition on the firm performance of non-compliant
firms relative to compliant firms? The first hypothesis broadly addresses the overall
performance of all publicly traded firms over the same period.2

2 The null hypothesis is consistent with the window-dressing view. Romano (2005) argues that setting
numerical targets of board independence will result in “quack corporate governance.” Insiders will be able
to nominate directors who are independent in the legal sense but sympathetic toward management.
Therefore, the mandate will not have a lasting impact on firm performance of non-compliant firms.
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H10: The relative performance of non-compliant firms is not affected by the
mandated change in board composition.

H11a: The relative performance of non-compliant firms is negatively affected by
the mandated change in board composition.

H11b: The relative performance of non-compliant firms is positively affected by
the mandated change in board composition.

While various theories suggest how the new mandate might impact long-run firm
performance, it is impossible to argue, a priori, that performance would either stay the
same, decrease, or increase, so in this case, the final answer remains an empirical
question.

Sub-Sample Hypotheses. Some researchers suggest that different companies
require different types of boards (see Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach,

2003; Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Harris & Raviv, 2008) and that a one-size-fits-all
mandate requiring outside board composition will not work for all publicly traded

companies. The following types of firms are studied here because they were previously
used in other studies: utility firms (Hirschey & Pappas, 1981), small firms (Chhaochharia
& Grinstein, 2007), and research-oriented firms (Coles, Daniels, & Naveen, 2008; Lu &

Wang, 2015, 2018). A separate hypothesis is presented for each characteristic that is
investigated based on their monitoring and advising needs.
Utility firms are heavily controlled by the government. Unlike other firms that

face regulation (especially financial firms), the regulation of utility firms creates barriers
to entry and provides monopoly power. As argued by Geddes and Vinod (2002), this

power lessens the need for the advising role of the board. Additionally, regulations create

25

substantial market power for utility firms. In such an environment, it is easy for

management to pursue its own interests at the expense of shareholder needs (Hirschey &

Pappas, 1981). Since independent board members focus on monitoring in utility firms,
this mandate will lead to an increase in the performance of non-compliant utility firms

following the mandate.
H2: The relative performance of non-compliant utility firms is positively impacted

by the mandated change in board composition.
Dalton et al. (1998) argued that the impact of outside directors on firm

performance is inversely dependent on firm size. Small firms are less complex, resulting

in a cleaner and faster flow of information between outside board members and
employees of the company (Dalton et al., 1998). Outside directors of smaller firms can

gather high-quality information to evaluate their management. It is also easier for outside
directors to become sufficiently familiar with the operations of small firms to provide
effective advice. This will allow independent boards to be capable monitors without

hindering their advisory function, leading to an increase in firm performance.
H3: The relative performance of non-compliant small firms is positively impacted

by the mandated change in board composition.
Prior to the mandate it was easier to be classified as independent as the new rules
are more restrictive as to what qualifies as an independent director. According to Pandya

and Bathala (2013) there are several relationships that impair independence following the
mandate. Under the new rules, previously classified independent directors, which were in

fact affiliated with the CEO and the firm, will now be classified as inside directors. For
instance, both Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007b) and Duchin et al. (2010) find that
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following the mandate, the independent directors on the board who concurrently serve as
executives of other firms declined. Furthermore, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007b)

show that after the mandate, interlocking directors were often replaced by independent
directors who had no corporate affiliation whatsoever. These directors were replaced by

people who have financial expertise to comply with the SOX act (Chhaochharia &
Grinstein, 2007b; Duchin et al., 2010); leading to a situation where the remaining
corporate directors may have little or no industry-specific knowledge. As a consequence,

it might be difficult for companies to hire new directors with industry-specific
knowledge.3
In retrospect, the top priority for corporate governance reformers when writing the

SOX legislation was to increase the representation of outside board directors to deal with
the agency problems that outraged the public in the late 1990s (e.g. Enron and

WorldCom). Coles et al. (2008) assert that the role of outside directors is to monitor
management while inside directors act as strategic advisors to management. Similarly,

Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2010) find that independent boards generally provide more

value as monitors and lower value as advisors. Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and
Raviv (2008) find that following the change from a majority of inside directors to

majority of independent directors, the firm specific knowledge of inside directors is

marginalized. For example, as Duchin et al. (2010) and Fairfax (2010) point out, that as
tougher independence guidelines were imposed on publicly traded firms through SOX

and exchange mandates, there was a significant decrease in firm-specific knowledge from

3 While this and other studies assume that outside directors do not have industry specific knowledge,
there is anecdotal evidence that in some cases outside directors are in fact industry experts.
Unfortunately, the data available to me does not allow one to identify this class of independent directors
which constitutes a limitation of the study.
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the board. Conversely, a shift towards fewer inside directors will result in a loss of

advising that is detrimental to firm performance for those in need of strategic advising.
The firm-specific knowledge of insiders is particularly important for research-

oriented firms because their value, to a greater extent, hinges upon well targeted
investment in innovative research. Coles et al. (2008) show that research-oriented firms
have greater advising needs for which the firm-specific knowledge of inside directors is

important. In a related manner, Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) find that excessive
monitoring can lead to diminished corporate innovation. Hence, following the mandate
research-oriented firms might experience a decrease in firm performance as outside

directors do not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge to properly advise management.

The impact of the mandated changes to board composition on firm performance might be
negative for research-oriented firms due to a reduced level of firm-specific knowledge by

new independent board members. Hence, hypothesis #4 reads as follows.
H4: The relative performance of non-compliant research-oriented firms is
negatively impacted by the mandated change in board composition.

It is evident from the literature reviewed above that there are arguments that
forcing a change to the board will increase firm performance for some firms. There are
also arguments that forcing the mandate on some firms will have a deteriorating effect on

firm performance. Unlike previous studies, this study considers the complex structure of
companies and the monitoring and advising needs of those firms.
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Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
Data. The data for this study were extracted from two sources. Information
regarding the board of directors comes from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS;

formerly RiskMetrics), which tracked the record of the S&P 1500 firms in the period
1996-2009, matched with the companies’ financial information provided by CompuStat
for 1997-2012. Similar to Bhagat and Black (2002) and Chhaochharia and Grinstem

(2007), this study includes only publicly traded US firms.
The affected firms were given a couple of years to comply with the mandate.
During that time, there might have been other regulations that caused policy shocks that I

assumed, similar to Lu and Wang (2018) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), would
impact all firms similarly. Furthermore, there was no shock at the time that affected firms
with only insider-control boards (see Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007).

Variables. Performance - Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Al-Matari, Al-

Swidi, and Fadzil (2014) noted that accounting-based performance measures are ideal
when the relationship between firm performance and board independence is examined, as
these measures present the outcome of management actions. The primary dependent

variable I use to measure firm performance is operating return on assets (OROA), similar
to Bhagat and Black (2001) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008). It is calculated as the ratio of

operating income before depreciation to total assets.

As an alternative accounting-based performance measure, I use return on sales as a
dependent variable to measure firm performance. It is calculated as the ratio of net
income to total sales.
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Inside Board is a constant variable used to determine the compliant and non-

compliant groups based on board composition prior to the 2002 exchange mandate. The
compliant (non-compliant) group consists of all firms that had outsider (insider) control
and, therefore, were unaffected (affected) by the mandate. Once the compliant and non-

compliant groups are established, changes in board composition in subsequent years

should be the result of the event, which forced companies to change from insider-control
boards to outsider-control boards.
Inside Board is primarily defined as firms with a majority of inside directors in the

year 2000, similar to Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Duchin et al. (2010), and Guo

et al. (2015). The value for Inside Board is 0 if the ratio of outside directors to the total
number of directors on the board is greater than 0.5, and the value is 1 if the ratio is equal
to or less than 0.5 in the year 2000.
To test the robustness of the independent variable, I changed the definition for Inside
Board. There is a concern that the first definition used to partition firms into compliant

and non-compliant groups might include a company that had a majority of inside or
outside directors for only the year 2000. To mitigate this possibility, I create an alternate

definition for Inside Board, where I define a non-compliant firm as one that had an
insider-control board for two consecutive years prior to 2003.
Specifically, the value for Inside Board is 1 if the firm had an inside board (the ratio

of outside directors to total directors was less than 0.5) for any two consecutive years
between 1996 and 2002.

Post Regulation is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the year 2002 and beyond, similar

to the variable used in Guo, et al. (2015). This is the year when the board independence
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mandate was announced requiring publicly traded companies to have a majority of
outside directors on the board. Some companies preemptively changed their board

composition to outside boards in 2002, the announcement year.

Control variables are used to restore randomness because large firms (Dalton et al.,
1998), leveraged firms (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013), and growth firms (Bathala & Rao,
1995) are likely to be impacted by the mandate. Furthermore, since these variables
determine firm performance in some way, adding those controls also accounts for cross

sectional and time-series variations. Total Assets represents the resources available for

firms to generate profit, and is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Marketto-Book Ratio represents the company’s growth opportunities. Book Leverage Ratio

represents the amount of total long-term debt the firm has. All control variables were

winsorized at the top and bottom percentiles. I also use industry and year fixed effects.
Appendix A provides more information about the variables.

Propensity Score Matching. The model employed here assumes that firms that

have to change their board structure to comply with the mandate are similar to firms that
do not have to change their board structure. Even if some of these variables are controlled

in the full sample, doing so may not fully address endogeneity concerns. Similar to Guo

et al. (2015), I considered a subsample of matched non-compliant and compliant firms to
see how firm performance in similar firms that differed in board independence prior to
the mandate changed following the mandate. I employed a propensity score methodology

with one-to-one matching with replacement, following Lu and Wang (2018).
To apply this strategy, I first estimated a logit model based on all firms during the
1997-2000 time period, where the dependent variable is whether or not the firm had an
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insider-control board in the year 2000. The independent variables included all control
variables as well as industry and year fixed effects. The logit model was estimated using
data for 1997-2000, and the estimation results are reported in Appendix B. The model

reported a concordance rate of 71%.4 Using the predicted values from the logit regression
for the year 2000, I applied the nearest-neighbor propensity score matching methodology

to yield a matched sample of 615 firms (356 non-compliant firms and 259 compliant
firms). The reason for the lower number of compliant firms can be attributed to the

replacement methodology used here, as some of these firms were matched with more
than one non-compliant firm. As a robustness check, I employed a propensity score

methodology with one-to-one matching without replacement and a two-to-one matching

without replacement methodology. The results using these methods are presented in

Appendices C and D, respectively.
Sample Statistics. Table 1 provides the sample statistics for the full sample using
both definitions of Inside Board as well as the matched sample created using the one-toone with replacement methodology. Panel A provides the summary statistics of the data

based on board information about firms in the year 2000, which includes a sample of

1,482 publicly traded firms and 19,103 unique annual observations. The sample firm had
average total assets of $11.7 billion, an average market-to-book-ratio of 2.95, an average

book leverage ratio of 23.72%, and an average operating rate of return on asset of
13.84%.

4 The concordant rate denotes the probability that a randomly selected subject who experienced the
outcome will have a higher predicted probability of having the outcome occur than a randomly selected
subject who did not experience the event (Austin & Steyerberg, 2012). If the model had no predicted
power, the concordant rate would be 50%.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the firms with inside boards and independent boards. The
statistics include average total assets (in millions of dollars), market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, and
operating return on assets. All firm-specific variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile.
Panel A shows the summary statistics for the firms grouped based on their corresponding board
information at the end of fiscal year 2000. Panel B shows the summary statistics for the firms grouped
based on their board composition for two consecutive years prior to 2003. Panel C shows the summary
statistics for the firms grouped based on their board composition in 2000. In this sample, the noncompliant firms are matched with compliant firms using the propensity score with one-to-one
replacement methodology. The information on firms is from fiscal years 1997 to 2012. T-Statistics
between values of Independent Board and Inside Board are shown in column 4. Statistical significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Panel A: Firms with Inside Board in Year 2000

Number of Firms
Total Assets
Market-to-Book
Ratio
Leverage Ratio
Operating Return
on Assets

Total Firms

Inside Board

1482
$11,773

356
$7,226

Independent
Board
1126
$13,129

2.95

2.97

2.94

0.23

23.72%

22.23%

24.16%

-1.82*

13.84%

14.91%

13.52%

2.58***

T-Statistics
-3.02***

Panel B: Inside Board for Two Consecutive Years prior to 2003

Number of Firms

Total Assets

Total Firms

Inside Board

1597

484

Independent
Board
1113

$11,431

$9,773

$12,160

T-Statistics

-1.39

Market-to-Book
2.90
2.71
2.98
-2.29**
Ratio
Leverage Ratio
23.41%
22.29%
23.90%
-1.71*
Operating Return
13.87%
14.48%
13.60%
1.88*
on Assets
Panel C: Inside Board in Year 2000 using Propensity Score Matching
Independent
Total Firms
Inside Board
T-Statistics
Board
Number of Firms
615
356
259
Total Assets
$8,532
$7,226
$10,200
-1.30
Market-to-Book
3.00
2.97
3.04
-0.37
Ratio
Leverage Ratio
23.03%
22.23%
24.06%
-1.17
Operating Return
14.52%
14.91%
14.02%
1.48
on Assets
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Of the 1,482 firms, 356 firms (24%) had insider-control boards with average total

assets of $7.3 billion, an average market-to-book ratio of 2.97, an average book leverage
ratio of 22.23%, and an average operating return on asset of 14.91%. The other 1,126

firms had outsider-control boards with average total assets of $13.1 billion, an average
market-to-book-ratio of 2.94, an average book leverage ratio of 24.16%, and an average

operating return on asset of 13.52%.
Column 4 of Table 1 shows the t-statistics for the values of the inside and
independent boards clustered across firms. Non-compliant firms in Table 1 Panel A were
significantly smaller than compliant firms, as measured by total assets. The market-to-

book ratio was slightly higher for non-compliant firms, but not significantly so. Noncompliant firms had significantly less book leverage than compliant firms do. Lastly,
non-compliant firms experienced a significantly greater operating return on assets than

compliant firms.

Table 1 Panel B provides the summary statistics for firms with Inside Board in
Two Consecutive Years Prior to 2003, which includes a sample of 1,597 publicly traded

firms. Of those 1,597 firms, 484 firms (30%) had insider-control boards, while the other

1,113 firms had outsider-control boards. Column 4 shows that based on total assets,
compliant and non-compliant firms were of similar size. However, non-compliant firms
still had a higher operating return on assets and lower leverage ratio. In this sample,

insider-control firms also had significantly lower growth opportunities.

As shown in Panels A and B, compliant and non-compliant firms did not have the
same firm characteristics. To address this issue, I used a subsample of similar compliant

and non-compliant firms using one-to-one matching with the replacement methodology.
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Panel C shows the summary statistics for the matched sample. As can be seen in column
4, there was no statistically significant difference between compliant and non-compliant
firms, unlike Panels A and B.

Research Method & Univariate DD
Full Sample. When studying the effect of board composition on firm

performance, it is necessary to consider simultaneity (a form of the endogeneity problem;
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Simultaneity exists when both the dependent and

independent variables are jointly determined simultaneously. For instance, Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) have shown that poor performance by an insider-control firm resulting
from actions by the current board will lead to a change in board composition, which

results in a change in performance. Thus, it can be argued that either firm performance

causes changes to board structure or board changes causes changes in firm performance.
In other words, board composition and firm performance are determined jointly. I

avoided the problem of simultaneity by analyzing the results of a natural experiment—the
exchange mandate of 2003—on non-compliant firms (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach,

2010).
I used the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation method suggested by Roberts

and Whited (2013), which approximates the results of an exogenous shock by comparing
the performance of non-compliant firms with compliant firms and removes factors that
affect both groups around the time of the mandate. The standard errors are clustered

across firms and are robust and heteroscedasticity consistent. The following equation was
used for the first hypothesis:
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Performance^ = [f + [f Inside Boards + ^2 (Inside Boards *
Post Regulation^) + fX,,( + 8t + Yt + sit.

(1)

The coefficient of the interaction variable Inside Board * Post Regulation, P_2, is
the primary variable of interest. It estimates the average differential in firm performance

for non-compliant firms following the mandate relative to the average differential in firm

performance for compliant firms. In other words, the interaction term measures the effect
of the mandate on insider-controlled firms following the regulation. The idea is that if a

firm already has an optimal governance structure, then changes in this structure due to

regulation should be worse for the firm that has to make the requested change. On the
other hand, if management is entrenched, changes in board composition due to the

exchange mandate should be beneficial for firms that make the required change.
Delta (8) indicates industry fixed effects, as categorized by Fama and French into
49 types. Upsilon (f) indicates year fixed effects. The coefficient of Post Regulation is

absorbed by year fixed effects. X represents the control variables mentioned previously.

The constant (fo) is suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap (similar to Adams &
Ferreira, 2009), and epsilon is the error term. All firm-specific variables are winsorized at

the top and bottom percentiles.

Subsample Tests. The second objective of this study is to examine whether the
impact of the mandate is the same across all firms. For the other hypotheses, I added a

firm characteristic variable to the model above:

Performance^ = [f + [f Inside Boards + ^2 (Inside Boards *
Post Regulation^) + f3 (Inside Boards * Firm Characteristici) +
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ß4 (Inside Boards * Post Regulationt * Firm Characteristici) + FX,,, + 5i +

Yt + (Xt * Firm Charcteristici) + Eit.

(2)

The Firm Characteristic examined in this study includes utility companies (firms

with SIC code 4), small firms (indicator variable based on those firms with total sales

below the median level in the year 2000), and research-oriented firms (continuous
variable based on their research intensity in the year 2000). The coefficient of the
interactive variable Inside Board * Post Regulation * Firm Characteristic, ß4, is the focus

of interest. It estimates the additional differential performance of non-compliant treated

firms following the mandate.5
To further illustrate the intuition behind this specification, we assume that the

firm characteristic in question is utility firms. Thus, the control variables and fixed effects

measure the average pre-mandate performance of non-utility compliant firms. The
coefficient of Inside Boards, ß1, represents the mean differential performance of non
utility non-compliant firms prior to the mandate. The first difference-in-difference term,

Inside Boards * Post Regulation, estimates the change in the differential
performance of non-utility non-compliant firms relative to non-utility compliant firms
from pre-mandate to post-mandate. The post-mandate differential performance of these

firms is determined by adding the coefficients of ß1and ß2. The sum is the estimated
differential firm performance of non-utility non-compliant firms relative to non-utility-

compliant firms.

5 This approach may affect the true differences since the control group of firms include firms that are
postulated to be impacted differentially. Therefore, tests on utility firms are replicated without small firms
and tests on small firms are replicated without utility firms. The results are qualitatively similar and are
presented in Appendix E.
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Similarly, the second difference-in-difference term, Inside Boards *

Firm Characteristic^, estimates the difference between utility firms and non-utility
firms in the differential pre-mandate performance of compliant firms over non-compliant
firms. The sum of the coefficients of P1 and ^3 estimates the differential performance of
non-compliant utility firms relative to non-utility-compliant firms prior to the mandate.

The coefficient of the triple difference term compares changes from pre-mandate
to post-mandate in the differential performance of utility firms for compliant and non-

compliant firms, compared to the similar difference for non-utility firms. In other words,

P4 measures the change in differential performance for non-compliant utility firms minus
the change in differential performance for compliant utility firms and also minus the

change in differential performance for non-utility non-compliant firms. Note that both

industry-specific and board-specific time trends are differenced out in the triple

difference estimation. The estimated differential performance post-mandate for noncompliant utility firms over non-utility compliant firms is given by adding the

coefficients ^1, ^2, ^3, and ^4. The total differential effect on utility non-compliant firms
following the mandate is calculated by taking the partial derivative with respect to Inside
Board and Post Regulation. It is sum of the coefficients on ^2 and ^4.

Along with the industry and year fixed effects, equation (2) also includes the

interaction of the sensitivity variable with year (Yt * Firm Characteristic) as a fixed
effect. This interaction term will allow year fixed effects to vary by subsample.
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Figure 1 Average Proportion of Outside Directors on the Board Over Time

Figure 1: A time series plot of the mean percentage of outside directors on the board over
time. An Insider-Controlled Board (Outsider-Controlled Board) is one that has (does not
have) a majority of inside directors in the year 2000.

Exogenous Shock.
To determine the exogenous shock (treatment effect), similar to Lu and Wang (2018),
I plotted the mean percentage of outside directors during 1996-2009 in Figure 1 using the

primary criteria for Inside Board. Figure 1 indicates that there was a significant difference
in board composition prior to 2000. The dotted line indicates compliant firms (outsider
control boards), while the solid line indicates non-compliant firms (insider-control
boards). Visual inspection of the figures verifies the exogenous shock to board
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independence. As firms brought on more outside directors, the two lines came closer
together, indicating a change from insider-control to outsider-control boards in order to

comply with the 2003 exchange mandate. The solid line, representing non-compliant

firms, shows that the number of independent directors almost doubled from 2001 to 2009.

Firms that were already compliant prior to the new regulation were not affected by the

mandate (a modest increase from 65% to 80%; an equivalent of adding one more
independent director), making them the obvious control group in a DD estimation
approach.

Univariate Difference-in-Difference.

The first purpose of this study is to determine whether the 2002 exchange
mandate, which forced companies to change board composition from insider-control to
outsider-control, impacted those companies’ (non-compliant firms) performance

compared to firms that did not have to change board composition (compliant firms).
Table 2 reports the results of applying the univariate difference-in-difference
methodology to firm performance between compliant and non-compliant firms before
and after the 2003 board independence mandate.

Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of operating return on assets using the

primary definition of Inside Board. Firm performance decreased for all firms following
the mandate, possibly reflecting the time trend. The difference-in-difference estimator is

positive and significant (0.894), indicating that operating performance decreased
significantly less for non-compliant firms than for compliant firms.
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Table 2: Univariate DD - Firm Performance
The following table shows the univariate difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the new
exchange regulations on firm performance for all firms for 1997-2012. In Panel A, the full sample uses
operating return on assets to measure firm performance. Panel B presents the results for operating return
on assets for the matched sample of treatment and control firms created with the propensity score
methodology. Panel C presents the results for operating return on assets where Inside Board is defined as
firms having insider-control boards for two consecutive years prior to the year 2003. In Panel D, firm
performance is measured through return on sales. Statistical significance of the difference-in-difference
estimate at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Panel A - Full Sample

Pre-Mandate

Post-Mandate

Difference

Compliant Firms

15.158

12.554

-2.604

Non-Compliant
Firms

15.952

14.243

-1.709

Difference

0.794

1.689

0.894**

Panel B - Matched Sample

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Pre-Mandate

Post-Mandate

Difference

15.802

12.930

-2.872

15.952

14.243

-1.709

0.150

1.313

1.163***

Panel C - Alternative Definition for the Independent Variable - Inside Board for
Two Consecutive Years prior to 2003

Pre-Mandate

Post-Mandate

Difference

Compliant Firms

15.302

12.582

-2.774

Non-Compliant
Firms

15.782

13.705

-2.077

Difference

0.480

1.123

0.643*

Panel D - Alternative Definition for the Dependent Variable

Return on Sales

Pre-Mandate

Post-Mandate

Difference

Compliant Firms

1.752

0.440

-1.312

Non-Compliant
Firms

-1.963

3.045

5.008

Difference

-3.715

2.605

6.32*
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Using the matched sample in Panel B, the DD estimator is positive at the 1%

significance level. Using the alternate definition of Inside Board in Panel C, the DD

estimator is still positive and significant. Using return on sales as a measure of firm

performance in Panel D, the DD estimator is also positive (6.32), which indicates that the

return on sales for non-compliant firms increased by more than 6%. The changes
observed in firm performance support the agency view that a new independent board will

cause a relative increase in firm performance following a change in board composition
compared to compliant firms.
Multiple Regression Results - All Firms
To confirm the results in Table 2, I conducted multiple regression analyses of the

effects of the forced change to outsider-control boards on firm performance during the

period 1997-2012 using difference-in-difference estimates. The results are presented in

Table 3. The coefficient for Inside Board in Year 2000 in column 1 is positive but not
significant (0.495), suggesting that after controlling for size, leverage, and growth
opportunities, there was no statistical difference between non-compliant and compliant

firms on average after using the control variables. The interactive coefficient for Inside
Board * Post Regulation is statistically significant and positive (0.766), suggesting that

relative firm performance for insider-control firms increased by approximately threefourths of a percentage point due to the forced change in their board structure over the
long run following the mandate. Compared to the univariate DD result, adding control

variables lowers the coefficient value; however, the impact is still statistically significant

at the 10% level.

42

______________________ Table 3: Full Sample Analysis______________________
The following table shows the result of least square regression analysis of the effects of the new
exchange regulations on performance of all firms for 1997-2012 using difference-in-difference
estimates. The dependent variable and the independent variables are described in Appendix A. Column 1
shows the primary results of the analysis using operating return on assets as the dependent variable.
Column 2 presents the results for operating return on assets where propensity score matching is used to
find firms that had similar characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with replacement.
In column 3, the dependent variable is changed to return on sales. Column 4 presents the results for
operating return on assets where the main independent variable - Inside Board - is defined as firms
having insider-control boards for two consecutive years prior to 2003. All firm-specific variables are
winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama & French 49 industries)
and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and
clustered at firm level. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively._______________________

Inside Board in Year
2000
Inside Board in 2
Consecutive Years Prior
to 2003
Inside Board * Post
Regulation

(1)
Primary
Results
(OROA)

(2)
Propensity
Score
Matching

0.495
(0.492)

0.058
(0.590)

(3)
Alternative
Definition
for
Dependent
Variable
Return on
Sales
-1.452
(2.676)

(4)
Alternative
Definition
for Inside
Board

0.430
(0.340)

0.766*
(0.471)

0.857*
(0.526)

6.186*
(3.435)

0.771*
(0.490)

Book Leverage Ratio

-0.079***
(0.024)

-0.030*
(0.016)

-0.475***
(0.118)

-0.072***
(0.023)

Market-to-Book Ratio

0.561***
(0.065)

0.514***
(0.094)

0.475***
(0.164)

0.588***
(0.066)

Total Assets

0.801**
(0.364)

0.016
(0.252)

2.303***
(0.472)

0.664**
(0.326)

Obs.

19103

7674

19103

20593

R-Square

0.184

0.198

0.024

0.181

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES
1482

YES
615

YES
1482

YES
1597

Number of Firms
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Of the control variables, Book Leverage Ratio shows negative associations with

firm performance in contrast to Total Assets and Market-to-Book-Ratio, which each have

a positive association with firm performance. Overall, the results described in Table 2
support the agency point of view that most boards were not optimally structured prior to

2002.
In column 2 of Table 3, I re-estimate equation 1 using the matched sample created
using the one-to-one with replacement propensity score methodology. The interaction

term Inside Board * Post Regulation is still positive and statistically significant,
suggesting that insider-control firms benefited due to the forced change in board

composition over the long run, indicating that the full sample result presented in column
1 of Table 3 is not due to differences between compliant and non-compliant firms.
In column 3, I changed the definition of firm performance from operating return on assets

to return on sales. The results indicate that relative accounting performance, as measured
by return on sales, increased by more than 6% for non-compliant firms compared to

compliant firms. It also allows us to establish a causal link between board independence
and firm performance.

Column 4 of Table 3 provides the regression results for firms with Inside Board in
Two Consecutive Years Prior to 2003. The dependent variable is operating return on

assets. The interaction term Inside Board * Post Regulation is still positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that the results are not data specific and that overall,

firms that had to change board composition (non-compliant firms) to comply with the
mandate benefited in the long run.
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Table 4: Robustness Analysis
The following table shows the result of least square regression analysis of the effects of the
new exchange regulations on firm performance of all firms for 1997-2012 using difference-in
difference estimates. The dependent variable is operating return on assets in all four columns.
The independent variables are described in Appendix A. In column 1, a generalized difference
in-difference methodology is used with firm fixed effects. In column 2, only data from 1996
2003 are used and the False Post Regulation Period starts from the hypothetical event year
2000. In column 3, the main independent variable - Inside Board - is defined as firms having
insider-control boards for three consecutive years prior to 2003. In column 4, the main
independent variable - Inside Board - is defined as firms having insider-control boards for any
three years prior to 2003. All firm-specific variables are winsorized at the top and bottom
percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama & French 49 industry classification) and year
fixed effects, except for column (1), which uses firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors
reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm level. Intercept
has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively._______________________________________

(1)
Generalized
Diff-in-diff

Inside Board in
Year 2000
Inside Board * Post
Regulation

(2)
Falsification
Test

(3)
Alternative
Definition for
Inside Board

0.547
(0.471)

0.838*
(0.472)

(4)
Alternative
Definition
for Inside
Board
0.703
(0.476)

0.887*
(0.473)

1.167**
(0.472)

0.806*
(0.457)

Inside Board *
False Post
Regulation
Book Leverage
Ratio

-0.095***
(0.024)

-0.072***
(0.015)

-0.078***
(0.026)

-0.077***
(0.476)

Market-to-Book
Ratio

0.237***
(0.042)

0.529***
(0.066)

0.689***
(0.072)

0.688***
(0.072)

1.310*
(0.705)

0.232
(0.195)

0.698*
(0.389)

0.693*
(0.387)

Obs.

19103

9805

18265

18313

R-Square

0.561

0.225

0.201

0.201

Industry Dummy

NO

YES

YES

YES

Year Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of Firms

1482

1482

1389

1393

Total Assets

-0.019
(0.400)
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Robustness Tests
To confirm these results, I performed several robustness tests. First, I controlled

for unobserved firm fixed effects, then tested the data for the parallel trend assumption

and performed a falsification test. Finally, alternative definitions were used as primary

independent variables.
Alternative Methodology. Equation 1 uses only industry and year fixed effects.

As an alternative specification, column 1 of Table 4 employs a generalized DD
methodology using firm and year fixed effects.6 The positive and significant coefficient

of the interaction term provides further assurance that the results shown in Table 3 are not
due to unobserved firm fixed effects and firms that had to change board structure benefit

over the long run.
Parallel Trend Assumption. The validity of the difference-in-difference approach

depends on the parallel trend assumption (Roberts & Whited, 2013). In the absence of the
exchange mandate, which passed in 2003, the assumption is that the difference between
the long-run performance of compliant and non-compliant firms is constant over time. To

test this assumption, I plotted the changes in operating returns for non-compliant firms

following the mandate, following Autor, Donohue III, and Schwab (2006) and Acharya,
Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) in constructing this graph. The graph plots the point

estimates and 95% confidence interval for lambda (!) using the following equation:

OROAit = 8t + Yt+ S2=i996^t (Yt * Inside Boards) + £it.

(3)

Delta (6) and upsilon (Y) are, respectively, vectors of industry and year dummies
to control for cross-sectional dependency. Inside Board is a dummy that assumes a value

6 The coefficients of Inside Board and industry fixed effects are absorbed by firm fixed effects.
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of 1 if the firm has an insider-control board in the year 2000. Errors are clustered at the
firm level. Conceptually, this equation removes the variation caused by economy-wide
shocks by running the regression with industry and year fixed effects and keeping only

the residuals. Additionally, the point estimate line is close to zero prior to the mandate

tests for the parallel trend assumption. The graph is shown in Figure 2.

Even without the control variables, Figure 2 indicates that the parallel trend
assumption holds, since no change is observed among the compliant and non-compliant

firms prior to 2003 (joint F-statistic for the years 1997-2002 is 0.38, with a p-value of
0.54). Furthermore, it provides visual evidence that firm performance increased for firms
that had to change their board structure after the passage of the mandate. The post

mandate F-statistic for the joint test of significance is 2.25, which is significant at the 5%
level (p = 0.034). This result is consistent with the results presented in Table 3.

Falsification Test. To further validate the research method, I repeat the DD

analysis of the pre-event years (1997-2003) with a hypothetical event year in between to

prove that the observed change in board composition was the result of the exchange
mandate and not the result of an alternative force. Duchin et al. (2010) argued that

corporate governance reform by exchanges started in 1999 with the audit committee
independence mandate. If this is the case, we should observe the effect on firm
performance prior to the mandate year. I selected the year 2000 as the hypothetical event

year, which is two years prior to the actual event year, 2002. The results of this test are
presented in Column 2 of Table 4. As expected, the DD variable is not statistically

significant, suggesting that there was no event prior to the mandate that could have had
an effect on firm performance.
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Figure 2 Operating ROA of Insider Controlled Firms over Time

Figure 2. This figure shows a visual difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of the
passage of the 2003 board independence mandate on relative firm performance of non-

compliant firms. On the y-axis, the graph plots operating return on assets; the x-axis
shows the the year of mandate (ranging from 5 years prior to adoption until 10 years after

the passage). The vertical line (for year 2002) indicates the year when the mandate was

announced. The dashed lines in the figure correspond to the 95% confidence intervals
based on standard errors that are clustered firms.
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Two cautions are warranted when interpreting this result. First, this test does not

prove causality that the board independence mandate caused changes in firm

performance. The falsification test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the pre-event
trend was zero. Additionally, it does not accept the null hypothesis for the parallel trend

assumption. Second, the low number of years with data available to perform the

falsification test (7 years) leads to noise in the data, which may hinder the detection of
any violation of the parallel trends when there is one, possibly leading to over-rejection

of the null hypothesis in the full sample (Kahn-Lang & Lang, 2018; Roth 2020).
Nonetheless, this falsification test plays an important role in validating the parallel trends
assumption underlying the DD methodology.

Alternative Definitions for the Independent Variable. To further test the

robustness of the independent variable, I changed the definition of non-compliant firms.

First, the definition of non-compliant firms was changed to include only firms that had
insider-control boards for three consecutive years prior to 2003. The results are presented

in column 3 of Table 4. Lastly, the definition of non-compliant firms was changed to
include only firms that had insider-control boards for any three years prior to 2003. The

results are presented in column 4. The effect of each definition on firm performance is

similar to the general result reported in column 1 of Table 3, regardless of how relaxed or
stringent the definitions for Inside Board are. It is also reasonable to interpret the results

of Table 3 as causal effects of the required change from insider-control to outsider
control boards.
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Table 5: Subsample Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the sub-sample. The third row indicates the percentage
of subsample firms with an independent board at the end of fiscal year 2000. The fourth row
indicates the percentage of subsample firms with an independent board at the end of fiscal year
2009. The sample statistics include average total assets (in millions of dollars), market-to-book ratio,
leverage ratio, and operating return on assets for the period 1997-2012. All firm-specific variables
are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. Panel A shows the summary statistics for utility and
non-utility firms. Panel B shows the summary statistics for small and large firms. Panel A shows the
summary statistics for research oriented and non-research-oriented firms. T-Statistics between
values of the control and treatment firms are shown in column 4. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.________________________________________
Panel A: Utility & Non-Utility Firms
Non-Utility
Utility Firms
T-Statistics
Firms
Number of Firms
177
1305
Number of Observations
2260
16843
Firms with Independent Board Pre-Mandate
82.49%
76.10%
Firms with Independent Board Post-Mandate
100%
100%
Total Assets
$12,580
$11,665
0.356
Market-to-Book Ratio
2.05
3.07
-5.76***
Leverage Ratio
36.35%
22.02%
10.70***
-2.59***
Operating Return on Assets
12.23%
14.05%

Panel B: Small & Large Firms
Small Firms
Large Firms
Number of Firms
740
742
Number of Observations
9109
9994
Firms with Independent Board Pre-Mandate
71.76%
80.19%
Firms with Independent Board Post-Mandate
100%
100%
Total Assets
$2,904
$19,857
Market-to-Book Ratio
2.93
2.97
Leverage Ratio
21.38%
25.85%
Operating Return on Assets
13.24%
14.38%
Panel C: Research Oriented & Non-research Oriented Firms
Research
Non-Research
Oriented
Oriented
Number of Firms
622
860
Number of Observations
8153
10950
Firms with Independent Board Pre-Mandate
77.33%
75.00%
Firms with Independent Board Post-Mandate
100%
100%
Total Assets
$7,931
$14,634
Market-to-Book Ratio
3.56
2.49
Leverage Ratio
20.66%
25.99%
Operating Return on Assets
14.43%
13.40%
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T-Statistics

-10.63***
-0.34
-5.01***
-2.53***
T-Statistics

-4.01***
9.43***
-5.92***
2.25**

Subsample Results

The second purpose of this study is to determine whether the effects of the board
independence mandate on long-run firm performance are the same across all types of

publicly traded companies. Which firms performed better as a result of monitoring and
advising by new independent boards? Based on the weakly significant results found in
the previous two tables, I hypothesized that the effect on firm performance was not

similar for all firms, as the needs of their boards would differ. The effect of the mandate
depends on the monitoring and advisory needs of firms.

Table 5 shows subsample summary statistics in three separate panels. Panel A
shows the sample statistics of the utility firms and the difference between utility and non

utility firms. For the fiscal year 2000, 82% of utility firms had independent boards and
76% of non-utility firms had independent boards. As firms were required to follow the

mandate, by the end of 2009 all utility firms had independent boards. As can be gleaned
from the total assets row, in Panel A, the difference in size between the two types of

firms was not statistically significant. As expected, utility firms had statistically lower
growth opportunities, as they are in a stable industry (2.05 vs 3.07). They also had higher

leverage (36% vs 22%) and lower operating return (12% vs 14%) than non-utility firms.

Panel B shows the sample statistics for the small and large firms. Small firms
included a lower percentage of firms with independent boards than large firms prior to
the mandate (72% vs. 80%). This is not surprising in light of previous research

(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007) showing that hiring independent directors might be

cost-prohibitive for small firms. By the end of fiscal year 2009, all firms had independent

boards reflecting the impact of the board independent mandate. As expected, small firms
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had lower assets than large firms ($3 billion vs. $19 billion). However, small firms did
not have statistically higher growth opportunities (2.93 vs. 2.97) but did have statistically

lower operating return on assets (13.24% vs. 14.38%). In addition, small firms had lower
long-term debt (21% vs. 26%).

Panel C compares research-oriented and non-research-oriented firms. For the
fiscal year 2000, 77% of research-oriented firms had independent boards, and 75% of
non-research-oriented firms had independent boards. After the passage of the mandate,

all the firms had an independent board. Research-oriented firms were smaller (total

assets: $8 billion vs. $15 billion) and had statistically lower debt (21% vs. 26%).
However, research-oriented firms had statistically higher growth opportunities (3.56 vs.

2.49) and higher operating return on assets (14% vs. 13%).
Tables 6-8 show the regression analyses for the effects of the forced change to
outsider-control boards on the performance of different types of publicly traded using

difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates. All tables use two different definitions

of Inside Board (columns 1 and 4), have matched samples created using one-to-one with
replacement methodology based on propensity scores (column 2), and use return on sales

as an alternate measure of accounting return (column 3). The mean difference of the
mandate on non-compliant subsample firms and other firms is given by adding the three-

term coefficient to the two interaction terms and the Inside Board term.
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_______________ Table 6: Subsample Analysis for Utility Firms_______________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the
new exchange regulations on performance of utility firms (SIC code 4) from 1997-2012 using
difference-in-difference estimates. The dependent variable and the independent variables are
listed in Appendix A. Column 1 shows the primary results of the analysis using operating
return on assets as the dependent variable. Column 2 presents the results on operating return on
assets where propensity score matching process is used to find firms that have similar
characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with replacement. In column 3, the
dependent variable is changed to return on sales. Column 4 presents the results for operating
return on assets where the main independent variable - Inside Board - is defined as firms
having insider-control boards for two consecutive years prior to the year 2003. All firm
specific variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use industry
(Fama & French 49 industry classification) and year fixed effects. The fourth-to-last row in
each column estimates the differential performance for non-compliant subsample firms over
compliant control firms post-mandate. The third-to-last row calculates the differential
performance in the non-compliant control firms post-mandate. The second-to-last row
calculates the differential performance for the non-compliant subsample firms and compliant
control firms prior to the mandate. The last row calculates the total differential effect of the
mandate in these firms. Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity
consistent and clustered at firm levels. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy
variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.__________________________________________________________________

Inside Board in Year 2000
Inside Board in 2 Consecutive Years
Prior to 2003
Inside Board * Post Regulation
Book Leverage Ratio

Market-to-Book Ratio

Total Assets

Inside Board * Utility Firms
Inside Board * Post Regulation *
Utility Firms
Obs.
R-square
Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Year * Utility Firms
Number of Firms

01 + 02 + 03 +04
01 + 02
01+03
02+04

(1)

(2)

(3)

OROA

Matched
Sample

Return on
Sales

0.372
(0.540)

0.265
(0.671)

1.905
(1.653)

0.629
(0.539)
-0.080***
(0.024)
0.554***
(0.064)
0.809**
(0.365)
-3.535**
(1.727)
4.405**
(1.767)
19103
0.189
YES
YES
YES
1482
1.871*
1.001**
-3.168**
5.034***
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0.534
(0.745)
-0.030*
(0.016)
0.508***
(0.093)
0.030
(0.253)
-3.482*
(1.970)
3.103**
(1.207)
7674
0.207
YES
YES
YES
615
0.420
0.799*
-3.217*
3.637**

3.724
(2.299)
-0.486***
(0.122)
0.425***
(0.163)
2.217***
(0.473)
-41.677
(26.154)
35.579*
(20.591)
19103
0.040
YES
YES
YES
1482
-0.469
5.629*
-40.737
35.049*

(4)
Alternative
Definition
for Inside
Board

0.081
(0.464)
0.196
(0.584)
-0.073***
(0.023)
0.581***
(0.065)
0.683**
(0.327)
-0.519
(1.387)
2.531*
(1.312)
20593
0.185
YES
YES
YES
1597
2.289**
0.277*
-0.323
2.727**

Utility Firms.
For this test, I identified utility firms with SIC codes beginning with 4. In column
1 of Table 5, the interactive coefficient for Inside Board * Post Regulation * Utility

Firms is positive and statistically significant (4.405). As utility firms face profit

maximization constraints, regulations create an environment in which the advisory skills
of boards are less valued. Since board members focus on monitoring in a firm where
monitoring costs are low (as the firm have fewer advisory needs), this mandate had a

pronounced impact on the performance of utility firms.

The differential firm performance post-mandate of non-compliant non-utility

firms (1.001) is statistically significant. Additionally, there was also a statistically

significant negative differential firm performance of non-compliant utility firms relative
to non-utility compliant firms prior to the mandate (-3.168). On the other hand, the

estimated differential performance post mandate for non-compliant utility firms relative
to compliant non-utility firms is 1.87%. The last row in each column indicates the total

differential effect of the mandate in these firms. In this case, there is a relative increase in
firm performance of non-compliant utility firms by 5%.
The results are robust whether the matched sample, an alternative definition for
the inside board, or an alternative definition are used for the dependent variable,

indicating a positive benefit for utility firms that are forced to change to outsider-control
boards. The results suggest that legislators were successful in affecting the monitoring

function in utility companies with SOX and other related mandates (since Enron and
WorldCom were considered utility firms).
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___________________ Table 7: Subsample Analysis for Small Firms__________________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the new
exchange regulations on the performance of small firms from 1997-2012 using difference-in
difference estimates. Sales is used as a proxy for size and Small Firms are those firms that have
below median net sales in the fiscal year 2000. The dependent variable and the independent
variables are listed in Appendix A. Column 1 shows the primary results of the analysis using
operating return on assets as the dependent variable. Column 2 presents the results for operating
return on assets where propensity score matching is used to find firms that have similar
characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with replacement. In column 3, the
dependent variable is changed to return on sales. Column 4 presents the results for operating return
on assets where the main independent variable - Inside Board - is defined as firms having insider
control boards for two consecutive years prior to 2003. All firm-specific variables are winsorized at
the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama & French 49 industry
classification) and year fixed effects. The fourth-to-last row in each column estimates the
differential performance for non-compliant subsample firms over compliant control firms post
mandate. The third-to-last row calculates the differential performance in the non-compliant control
firms post-mandate. The second-to-last row calculates the differential performance for the noncompliant subsample firms and compliant control firms prior to the mandate. The last row
calculates the total differential effect of the mandate in these firms. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm levels. Intercept has been
suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.__________________________________________________
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Alternative
Matched
Return on
OROA
Definition for
Sample
Sales
Inside Board
0.791
0.092
0.018
Inside Board in Year 2000
(0.579)
(0.813)
(1.650)
Inside Board in 2 Consecutive
0.562
Years Prior to 2003
(0.487)
Inside Board * Post Regulation
0.032
-0.060
0.858
0.095
(0.511)
(0.831)
(1.880)
(0.441)
Book Leverage Ratio
-0.079***
-0.028*
-0.467***
-0.071***
(0.024)
(0.016)
(0.114)
(0.023)
Market-to-Book Ratio
0.563***
0.509***
0.412**
0.589***
(0.065)
(0.093)
(0.162)
(0.067)
Total Assets
0.907*
-0.169
-0.141
0.753
(0.511)
(0.288)
(1.291)
(0.468)
Inside Board * Small Firms
-0.588
-0.033
-2.847
-0.223
(0.897)
(1.207)
(4.552)
(0.832)
Inside Board * Post Regulation *
1.543*
1.757*
10.408*
1.656*
Small Firms
(0.924)
(0.997)
(1.034)
(6.345)
19103
7674
19103
20593
Obs.
R-square
0.185
0.202
0.028
0.182
Industry Dummy
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year Dummy
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year * Small Firms
YES
YES
YES
YES
1482
615
1482
1597
Number of Firms
1.778**
1.756**
8.437*
2.090*
01 + 02 + 03 + 04
0.823
0.032
0.876
0.657
01 + 02
0.203
0.059
-2.829
-0.128
01+03
1.575*
1.697*
11.266*
1.751*
02+04
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Small Firms.

Similar to Coles et al. (2008), I use total sales as a proxy for firm size. As argued
by Dang, Li, and Yang (2018), total sales is a backward-looking measure focusing on

managerial actions. Using an indicator variable, small firms are defined as those that had
net total sales below the median level in 2000.7 Approximately 28% of small firms had an

inside board at the end of fiscal year 2000, which is greater than the percentage of non-

compliant firms in the full sample. In column 1 of Table 7, the term for Inside Board *
Post Regulation * Small Firms is statistically significant and positive (1.460), consistent

with the hypothesis that the mandate had a more pronounced impact on smaller firms.
The differential firm performance post-mandate for non-compliant large firms

over compliant large firms (0.823) is not statistically significant. Similarly, the
differential performance of non-compliant small firms relative to large compliant firms
prior to the mandate (0.203) is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the

estimated differential performance post-mandate for non-compliant small firms over

compliant large firms is 1.78, which is significant at the 5% level. The total differential
increase in performance of non-compliant small firms following the mandate is 1.575%.

Similar results to column 1 are found if the matched sample is used, firm performance is
measured through return on sales, or if non-compliant firms are alternately defined.

These results differ from the announcement results found by Chhaochharia and

Grinstein (2007), who argued that SOX and a new exchange mandate would pose an
undue burden for small firms in the long run. The long-run observations found here for

7 According to Harrell (2001), using indicator variables provides certain advantages over using continuous
variables, such as avoiding the influence of outliers and imposing less structure on the data (by not
assuming a linear form).
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small firms suggest that increased monitoring by the new independent board significantly

increased firm performance without increasing the cost to the firm, as the advisory role of
the board was not sacrificed. Independent directors were able to familiarize themselves

with small firms’ operations due to their relative lack of complexity.
R&D Intensity.
To measure research intensity, the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets at the end

of fiscal year 2000 was used. Consistent with the literature, for firms missing R&D data
on CompuStat, R&D expenses were set to 0.8 In column 1 of Table 7, the interactive
coefficient for Inside Board * Post Regulation * R&D Intensity is negative and

statistically significant (-7.811), consistent with the hypothesis. The differential firm
performance of non-compliant non-research-oriented firms over compliant non-research-

oriented firms post-mandate (1.012) is statistically significant. However, the differential

firm performance of non-compliant research-oriented firms relative to non-researchoriented non-compliant firms prior to the mandate (0.763) is statistically not significant.
On the other hand, the differential performance post mandate for non-compliant research
firms over non-research-oriented compliant firms is -0.56, which is significant at the

10% level.9 The differential total decrease in performance of non-compliant researchoriented firm following the mandate is 1.4%. Outside directors are not knowledgeable
enough about research-oriented firms to provide adequate advice, leading to a decrease in

relative firm performance in non-compliant firms following the mandate compared to

compliant firms.

8 Due to high number of firms with zero R&D Expense, using categorical variables would only include firms
with zero R&D expense in the low R&D Intensity category.
9 The interaction terms are multiplied by the mean value of R&D Intensity (0.06) and added to other
coefficients.
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________________ Table 8: Subsample Analysis for Research Oriented Firms_______________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the new
exchange regulations on performance of research-oriented firms for 1997-2012 using difference-in
difference estimates. Research Intensity is defined as the percentage of total assets devoted to
research and development expense in the fiscal year 2000. The dependent variable and the
independent variables are listed in Appendix A. Column 1 shows the primary result of the analysis
using operating return on assets as the dependent variable. Column 2 presents the results for
operating return on assets where propensity score matching process is use to find firms that have
similar characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with replacement. In column 3,
the dependent variable is change to return on sales. Column 4 presents the results for operating
return on assets where the main independent variable - Inside Board - is defined as firms having
insider-control boards for two consecutive years prior to 2003. All firm-specific variables are
winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama & French 49
industry classification) and year fixed effects. The fourth-to-last row in each column estimates the
differential performance for non-compliant subsample firms over compliant control firms post
mandate. The third-to-last row calculates the differential performance in the non-compliant control
firms post-mandate. The second-to-last row calculates the differential performance for the noncompliant subsample firms and compliant control firms prior to the mandate. The last row
calculates the total differential effect of the mandate in these firms. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm levels. Intercept has been
suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.__________________________________________________
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Alternative
Matched
Return on
Definition
OROA
Sample
Sales
for Inside
Board
0.070
-0.472
-3.292
Inside Board in Year 2000
(0.491)
(0.583)
(3.170)
Inside Board in 2 Consecutive
0.745*
Years Prior to 2003
(0.434)
Inside Board * Post Regulation
0.942*
1.656***
10.526**
1.087*
(0.528)
(0.636)
(4.133)
(0.595)
Book Leverage Ratio
-0.080***
-0.033**
-0.488***
-0.072***
(0.022)
(0.016)
(0.120)
(0.021)
Market-to-Book Ratio
0.575***
0.524***
0.536***
0.595***
(0.065)
(0.093)
(0.163)
(0.065)
Total Assets
0.699**
-0.067
2.016***
0.555**
(0.328)
(0.250)
(0.465)
(0.275)
Inside Board * Research Intensity
11.550
18.333
56.918
-17.426
(12.095)
(17.129)
(47.298)
(12.874)
Inside Board * Post Regulation *
-37.811*
-32.493*
-173.890*
-39.055**
(18.976)
(20.008)
(104.316)
(17.040)
Research Intensity
19103
7674
19103
20593
Obs.
R-square
0.207
0.214
0.028
0.210
Industry Dummy
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year Dummy
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year * Research Intensity
YES
YES
YES
YES
1482
615
1482
1597
Number of Firms
-0.563*
-0.334*
0.216
-1.556**
01 + 02 + 03 + 04
1.012*
1.184*
7.234**
1.832**
01 + 02
0.763
2.756
0.123
-0.300
01+03
-1.399*
-0.355*
-0.234*
-1.389**
02+04
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The results are qualitatively similar if the matched sample (where 54% firms have

inside board), alternative definition for inside board (where a quarter of firms have inside
board), or alternative definition for the dependent variable are used. These findings are

consistent with the short-run announcement results of Wintoki (2007), indicating that
shareholders correctly expected that this mandate would have a negative impact on
research-oriented firms.

Conclusion

The general results in Tables 2-4 indicate that, overall, forcing non-compliant

firms to adopt outsider-control boards positively impacted firm performance over the
long run, which is consistent with the agency view, as explained by Jensen and Meckling

(1976) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004), and consistent with the announcement returns
observed by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007). The sub-sample results of Tables 5-8,

however, suggest that the positive results are concentrated in certain non-compliant firms.
Utility firms and small firms benefited from the change to outsider-control boards. On the

other hand, non-compliant research-oriented firms suffered from changes in their board
composition. It is evident that outsider oversight works well for some firms, but for
others, it is detrimental. The sub-sample results are consistent with the argument that
exchanges should encourage board independence but not make it mandatory (Romano,

2005). Companies should be free to choose their board composition based on their
monitoring and advisory needs.

This is the first study to examine board composition and firm performance over a
10-year period following the 2003 exchange mandate. This is also the first study to

provide a long-term cross-sectional analysis of different types of firms following the
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mandate. Finally, the results and conclusions of the research shed light on the long
standing discussion between agency and insider knowledge theorists over the optimal

structure of the board and its impact on firm performance, whereby this research holds

policy implications. Future research could examine how the exchange mandate affected
firms in other ways, such as the impact on CEO compensation and CEO ownership.
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Variable

R&D Expense
Net Income
R&D Intensity
Total Sales
Total Assets

Operating Income

SIC
Utility Firms
Inside Board in
Year 2000
Inside Board in
Two Consecutive
Years Prior to
2003

Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Definition
Source
Costs related to the development of new
CompuStat
products and services
Net income at the end of fiscal year
CompuStat
Compustat
(R&D Expense / Total Assets)
CompuStat
Net total sales at the end of fiscal year
CompuStat
Total assets at the end of fiscal year
Operating income before depreciation at the
CompuStat
end of the year
Office of Management and Budget's Standard
CompuStat
Industry Classification Code
1 if the firm’s SIC code begins with 4
CompuStat
1 if percentage of outsiders was less than 50%
RiskMetrics
in year 2000

RiskMetrics

1 if the percentage of outsiders was less than
50% in two consecutive years prior to year
2003

CompuStat

(Net Income / Total Sales) * 100

CompuStat

Market capitalization / Common Stock

CompuStat

(Operating Income / Total Assets) * 100

Book Leverage
Ratio

CompuStat

(Debt in Current Liabilities + Long-Term
Liabilities) / Total Assets

Post Regulation

-

Denotes 1 for the years 2002 and beyond
following the passage of stock-exchange
mandate

Return on Sales

Market-to-Book
Ratio
Operating Return
on Assets
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Appendix B: Propensity Score Model
The following table reports the coefficient estimates of the logit model used to predict a firm
having an insider-control board in the year 2000. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm had a
majority of insiders on the board of directors in the year 2000 and 0 otherwise. The independent
variables are listed in Appendix A. The sample consists of all firm years from 1997-2000. All
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year
fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent and
clustered along firms. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap.
Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Variables

Probability of Inside Board

0.004**

Book Leverage Ratio

(0.002)
-0.233***

Total Assets

(0.016)

-0.015*
Market-to-Book Ratio

(0.008)

Percent Concordant

70.8%

Chi Square

1324.94

Industry Dummy

YES

Year Dummy

YES

Number of
Observations

5805
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_________________________ Appendix C: PSM without Replacement_______________________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the new
exchange regulations on firm performance of all firms from 1997-2012 using difference-in-difference
estimates. Here the propensity score matching process is used to find firms that had similar
characteristics based on the one-to-one nearest neighbor methodology without replacement. The
dependent variable is operating return on assets in all four columns. The independent variables are
described in Appendix A. In column (1), I look at performance of all firms. In column (2), firms with
SIC code 4 are designated as Utility Firms. In column (3), Small Firms have below median net sales in
fiscal year 2000. In column (4), R&D Intensity as the percentage of total assets devoted to research and
development expense in the fiscal year 2000. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom
percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama and French 49 industry classification) and year fixed
effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered along the
firms. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
OROA
OROA
OROA
OROA
0.443
0.783
1.490*
-0.455
Inside Board in Year 2000
(0.610)
(0.639)
(0.775)
(0.601)
Inside Board * Post Regulation
0.951*
0.759
-0.953
0.725
(0.605)
(0.736)
(0.774)
(0.892)
Inside Board * Utility Firms
-3.855**
(1.866)
Inside Board * Post Regulation *
3.870*
Utility Firms
(2.255)
Inside Board * Small Firms

-1.729
(1.173)
3.353**
(1.356)

Inside Board * Post Regulation *
Small Firms
Inside Board * R&D Intensity
Inside Board * Post Regulation *
R&D Intensity
Book Leverage Ratio

Market-to-Book Ratio

Total Assets
Obs.
R-squared
Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Year*Characteristic Variable
Number of Firms

-0.086**
(0.040)
0.553***
(0.099)
1.017
(0.788)
8900
0.144
YES
YES
NO
712
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-0.086**
(0.040)
0.550***
(0.099)
1.020
(0.788)
8900
0.147
YES
YES
YES
712

-0.085**
(0.040)
0.554***
(0.100)
1.356
(1.035)
8900
0.148
YES
YES
YES
712

26.571
(16.370)
-32.998*
(13.310)
-0.082**
(0.035)
0.553***
(0.097)
0.698
(0.630)
8900
0.189
YES
YES
YES
712

Appendix D: PSM 2-to-1 without Replacement
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the new
exchange regulations on firm performance of all firms from 1997-2012 using difference-in-difference
estimates. Here the propensity score matching process is used to find firms that had similar
characteristics based on the two-to-one nearest neighbor methodology without replacement: For every
non-compliant firm, I use two compliant firms. The dependent variable is operating return on assets in
all four columns. The independent variables are described in Appendix A. In column (1), I look at
performance of all firms. In column (2), firms with SIC code 4 are designated as Utility Firms. In
column (3), Small Firms have below median net sales in fiscal year 2000. In column (4), R&D Intensity
as the percentage of total assets devoted to research and development expense in the fiscal year 2000. All
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama and French
49 industry classification) and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered along the firms. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the
dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.__________________________________________________________________________
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
OROA
OROA
OROA
OROA
0.515
0.781
0.666
-0.034
Inside Board in Year 2000
(0.517)
(0.533)
(0.614)
(0.526)
Inside Board * Post Regulation
0.749*
0.595
0.039
0.916
(0.432)
(0.555)
(0.575)
(0.632)
Inside Board * Utility Firms
-3.077*
(1.777)
Inside Board * Post Regulation * Utility
3.794*
Firms
(1.966)

Inside Board * Small Firms

-0.285
(0.973)
1.343**
(0.420)

Inside Board * Post Regulation * Small
Firms
Inside Board * R&D Intensity

18.066
(12.853)
-37.666*
(23.413)

Inside Board * Post Regulation * R&D
Intensity
Book Leverage Ratio

Market-to-Book Ratio

Total Assets
Obs.
R-squared
Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Year*Characteristic Variable
Number of Firms

-0.069**
(0.027)
0.536***
(0.074)
0.747
(0.513)
13575
0.152
YES
YES
NO
1068
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-0.070**
(0.027)
0.536***
(0.074)
0.755
(0.514)
13575
0.155
YES
YES
YES
1068

-0.069**
(0.028)
0.537***
(0.075)
0.863
(0.701)
13575
0.153
YES
YES
YES
1068

-0.069***
(0.025)
0.545***
(0.075)
0.615
(0.459)
13575
0.178
YES
YES
YES
1068

________________ Appendix E: Additional Subsample Analyses_______________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the
new exchange regulations on firm performance of utility and small firms from 1997-2012
using difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates. For the first column, small firms are
removed from the data. For the second column, utility firms are removed from the data. The
dependent variable is operating return on assets in all four columns. The independent variables
are described in Appendix A. In column (1), firms with SIC code 4 are designated as Utility
Firms. In column (2), Small Firms have below median net sales in fiscal year 2000. All
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use industry (Fama
and French 49 industry classification) and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered along the firms. Intercept has been
suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.____________________________________________

(1)
OROA
0.934*
(0.507)
-0.531
(0.495)

Inside Board in Year 2000
Inside Board * Post Regulation
Inside Board * Utility Firms

(2)
OROA
1.007*
(0.607)
-0.515
(0.515)

-2.969
(2.104)
7.748***
(2.173)

Inside Board * Post Regulation *
Utility Firms
Inside Board * Small Firms

-0.383
(0.942)

Inside Board * Post Regulation *
Small Firms

1.978**
(0.956)

Book Leverage Ratio

-0.039***
(0.012)

-0.085***
(0.027)

Market-to-Book Ratio

0.616***
(0.062)
-0.356**
(0.166)

0.582***
(0.071)
1.131**
(0.568)

9994
0.358
YES
YES
YES
742

16843
0.191
YES
YES
YES
1305

Total Assets
Obs.
R-squared

Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Year*Characteristic Variable
Number of Firms
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CHAPTER III
ESSAY 2: MANAGERIAL POWER VS COMPLEMENTARITY: A STUDY ON THE
AGENCY EFFECT OF BOARD COMPOSITION ON CEO COMPENSATION

Introduction

Agency conflicts arise when decision makers do not bear the full consequences of

their actions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists believe that as CEOs are self
serving and unscrupulous (Fan, 2004), a strong governance mechanism resulting from an

outsider-control board is needed (a board with a majority of independent directors) to
better align the actions of management with shareholder interests. Following the scandals

of the early 21st century, stock market regulators decided that stronger corporate

governance was needed to protect shareholders from CEOs and their management. As a
result, in 2003 the listing exchanges (Amex, NASDAQ, and NYSE), with backing from
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), required publicly traded companies to

change board composition from insider-control to outsider-control in the belief that

independent directors would be better able to monitor CEOs. The goals of this study are
to examine the impact of this mandate on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and total
CEO compensation for firms that had to change board composition.

71

Agency theorists believe that CEOs of insider-control boards have sufficient
influence to determine how much of their compensation is through pay-for-performance

sensitivity (incentive-based pay) and how much is in cash (including other forms of non
incentive pay), resulting in compensation packages that are out of line with shareholder

interests. Greater pay-for-performance sensitivity should be used to align the interests of
CEOs with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization. Jensen and Murphy (1990)
showed that increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity forces self-centered CEOs to

adopt policies that maximize shareholder wealth. A strong board will be able to create a
compensation plan with more incentives (usually in the form of stock grants) to better
align the actions of management with shareholder interests (Hartzell, & Starks, 2003).
Thus, my first hypothesis is that the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity of firms that

had to change their board structure increased following the mandate.
Similar to Hartzell and Starks (2003), I measure pay-for-performance sensitivity
as the change in total compensation as a result of a change in the market value of equity.

Similar to Duchin et al. (2010) and Guo et al. (2015), firms were sorted into two groups

based on their board composition level in the year 2000: firms that had to change their
board structure (non-compliant firms) and firms that did not have to change their board
structure (compliant firms). Even after controlling for new disclosure requirements

related to executive compensation by the SEC and the mandate of the Fair Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) regarding expensing the options awarded, my results were

consistent with the agency theory: pay-for-performance sensitivity increased for noncompliant firms following the mandate.10 However, it is possible to argue that, by

10 See Appendix B for details regarding the new pay disclosure requirements.

72

employing greater pay-for-performance sensitivity, total CEO compensation either
increases (complementarity view) or decreases (managerial power view) in the long term.

The second goal of this study is to examine the impact on total CEO compensation in the

long term due to the mandated change in board composition.
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) argue that CEOs can extract uneven compensation
from the board of directors if the board is controlled by insiders. CEOs have too much

sway over inside board members, as CEOs are ultimately responsible for their primary
job and pay. Consequently, CEOs have disproportionate influence over their own

compensation (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997). As a result, the current structure of
executives’ pay has allowed management to secure substantial monetary gains even when

their companies’ performance is deficient (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). In other words, the
CEO compensation packages are often excessive. Under this view, called the managerial

power view, we expect the outside board of directors to deal with the agency problem by
reducing CEOs’ influence from their associated compensation packages (Bebchuk &

Fried, 2004, 2005). This means that total CEO compensation for non-compliant firms
will be reduced following the board independence mandate.

Fahlenbrach (2009) argues that governance mechanisms and pay-for-performance
contracts complement one another. Frydman and Jenter (2010) claim that the existing

level of CEO pay is not excessive and is the result of competitive equilibrium in the

market of talented CEOs. Increased pay-for-performance sensitivity robs CEOs of the
ability to invest their income elsewhere, including the ability to diversify their
investments. Additionally, because long-term incentive plans fail to mature unless a
definite benchmark is reached, increasing firm-specific risks causes a decrease in the
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value of CEO compensation packages (Fahlenbrach, 2009).11 Thus, to increase the value

of an incentive plan for executives, under this complementarity view, boards must also
concurrently increase total compensation (Core, Guay, & Thomas, 2005).

While both the managerial power and complementarity views suggest how the

new mandate might have impacted CEO compensation, in a number of cases it is
impossible to argue, a priori, that CEO compensation would likely either decrease or
increase, so in these cases the final answer remains an empirical question. In some
studies, an independent board is needed to rein in CEO compensation (Bebchuk & Fried,

2004, 2005). Others insist that adoption of an independent board will result in an increase
in CEO compensation (Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Core, et al., 2005). The second
hypothesis addresses the impact of the mandate on the total CEO compensation of noncompliant firms.

Overall, my findings indicate that total CEO compensation increased in the long
run for non-compliant firms following the mandate compared to compliant firms. The

result is consistent with the complementarity view that, along with their pay-forperformance sensitivity, incumbent CEOs at non-compliant firms will receive an increase

in total compensation, as the new independent boards will reimburse CEOs to bear
greater firm-specific risks. This long-term result has not been documented previously in
the literature.
I controlled for additional factors that might have confounded the results. First, I

controlled for the new disclosure requirements as a result of FAS 123R, which might

11 The major compensation component of CEO pay-for-performance component is often a long-termincentive plan (LTIP), which is vested over time and does not mature for several years (Conyon & Murphy,
2000; Goergen & Renneboog, 2011). This is another reason why a long-term study is needed to capture the
effect of the mandate on CEO compensation.
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have changed the level and structure of CEO compensation. Second, I tested whether
prior mandates by listing exchanges affected total CEO compensation through a

falsification test. Third, I controlled for the increase in compensation resulting from the
signing bonus awarded to new CEOs. Fourth, I also controlled for yearly shocks that
might have impacted the supply and demand of CEOs in a particular industry. I found

that these confounding factors do not impact the primary results: The board independence

mandate increased total CEO compensation in non-compliant firms.

The increase in total CEO compensation can be through cash compensation, non
incentive equities, or additional restricted stock options. If the increase is through cash

compensation, one could argue that this increase by an independent board is a sign of the

bargaining power of an entrenched CEO (Bebchuk & Fried, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach,

2004). I performed additional tests on cash and equity compensation to confirm that the
results expected under the complementarity view hold. The complementarity view

predicts an increase in total compensation due to strong governance mechanisms. Thus,

we would expect the increase in total compensation not to be through cash compensation
but through equity compensation. I examined total cash compensation and found no

change in cash compensation for non-compliant firms following the mandate. When I
examined equity compensation, I found that non-compliant firms increased equity

compensation compared to compliant firms following the mandate, which is consistent
with the complementarity view.
This study belongs to a group of studies that show that board structure is an

important variable explaining CEO pay variation. However, I avoided the pitfalls of other
such studies. For instance, Fahlenbrach (2009) failed to control for exogenous shocks;
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Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012) focused on a short

time frame; and Chhaochharia and Grinstein’s (2009) study is plagued by a technical
irregularity that renders their results inconclusive. In addition, unlike previous studies
(see review studies by Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach,

2010; Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Edmans,
Gabaix, & Jenter, 2017), I present a detailed picture of long-term changes in CEO
compensation.

My contributions to the literature are as follows: This is the first study to examine
board composition and CEO compensation over the 10-year period following the
exchange mandate of 2003. It expands the literature on the effect of changes in board

composition on CEO compensation over a longer period than the short-run analyses of

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie et al. (2012). The results and conclusions

of this research have the potential to reconcile two agency views over the CEO’s optimal
pay: managerial power and complementarity. This research shows that one of the reasons

for variations in CEO compensation is changes in board composition as an effect of the

board independence mandate, in which respect this study holds policy implications.
Section II of this paper briefly reviews the literature and discusses the research
hypotheses. Section III describes the data, variable usage, and summary statistics. The

main results on pay for performance sensitivity are presented in Section IV. Section V
conducts tests on total compensation. Section VI presents robustness tests related to total
compensation. Section VII reports the results for cash versus equity compensation.
Section VIII concludes.
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Literature Review
In this section, I describe the 2003 mandate on changes in board structure and

how the new independent board might set CEO compensation. Next, I describe the
agency theory and its predictions of pay-for-performance sensitivity. I then make a series

of predictions regarding decreases or increases in total CEO compensation following a
change in board composition based on a body of agency literature related to the

relationship between board composition and CEO compensation in accordance with the
managerial power and complementarity views.12

Board Independence Mandate. Following the scandals of the early 21st century,
regulators decided that much stronger corporate governance was needed to protect
shareholders from CEOs and their management. As a result, AMEX, NASDAQ, and
NYSE required publicly traded companies to change board composition from insider

control to outsider-control (one with a majority of independent directors). Moreover, the
monitoring function of boards was increased following the mandate, with independent

directors responsible for evaluating management performance, determining management

salary (or ratifying and approving salaries if the firm had a compensation committee13),
and ensuring the integrity of the audit process (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007).14 An

12 It is important to note that these views are part of agency theory. As argued by Murphy (2013), the
establishments that exist to minimize agency costs between managers and shareholders (i.e., the
complementarity view) have allowed managers to extract rents by exacerbating the agency problem
between shareholders and directors (i.e., the managerial power view).
13 One might argue that examining changes in compensation committee structure might be more important
and informative than looking at overall board independence. However, most compensation committees are
made up of independent directors because SEC guidelines have required firms since 1994 to have a
compensation committee comprised entirely of independent directors in order to be exempt from a $1
million executive salary cap (see Murphy, 2013).
14 Along with the mandate, Congress also the passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Since SOX
and the board independence mandate were passed around the same time, it is impossible to separate the
effects of the mandate from those of SOX. For instance, Guo et al. (2015) used board composition levels to
study SOX effects, while Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) used SOX mandates to study the effects of the
mandate.
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important distinction to note is that prior to the mandate, the move toward an independent
board was largely an endogenous decision by the firm, while the mandate was an
exogenous shock. Thus, the passage of the mandate affords us a natural experiment to
study the impact of the outside board on CEO compensation.

CEO Compensation Setup. In a typical setup to determine CEO pay, the compensation

committee determines the CEO’s market wage necessary for executive retention through
peer benchmarking, with help from compensation consultants (Ellig, 2001). According to

Clifford (2017), who served as a chief executive officer in the broadcasting industry for

over 14 years and as board director for 13 different companies, the compensation
committee begins the process of determining the compensation package for key
executives by first approving a peer group, which can be recommended by management,

consultants, or members of the board. The peer group generally consists of firms that are

similar in terms of industry, size, and complexity as a means of gauging the market wage

of their own CEO necessary to retain that executive (Ellig, 2001; Elson & Ferrere, 2012).
More than 85% of firms use some benchmarking criteria to set CEO compensation

(Albuquerque et al., 2013). For example, the compensation committee for a food
producer may include technology companies, insurance companies, financial firms, and
other unrelated firms in their peer group. The compensation committee can decide which
companies are included in the peer group. Ultimately, the board of directors can accept,

reject, or revise the peer group as they see fit. This example highlights the influence of
the board on the benchmarking process.
After selecting the peer group, the committee formally benchmarks the CEO’s

compensation to that of the peers. Firms generally want to signal strength to the market
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by selecting a salary that is above average. It is common to benchmark CEOs to the 50th,
70th, or 90th percentile (Elson & Ferrere, 2012). This process can be used to negotiate all

or part of the compensation package with the CEO (Clifford, 2017). In addition to
negotiating the package, the board must negotiate the performance measures used in

consideration of how much of that pay will be through incentives. Even if the board does
not decide the size of the bonus, the directors must find a way to connect CEO

performance to the incentive plan.

It is natural to question what role the new independent boards could play in
determining CEO compensation in this environment. Although the goal should be to
compare similar firms in the benchmarking process, Clifford (2017) emphasizes that

practice is often different from theory. As shown by Bebchuk and Fried (2004), in most
cases, compensation consultants are used to justify exuberant CEO pay. As reviewed by

Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Adams et al. (2010), Frydman and Jenter (2010), and
Edmans et al. (2017), the board of directors can influence some or all parts of CEO pay

because creating a compensation plan is not a mechanical process. First, as argued by
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), following a change in board composition, the whole
board decides on the kind of compensation committee to select (whether smart, assertive,
docile, or compliant). Second, it is still up to the entire board to agree upon the

compensation package and decide whether to ratify or modify the committee’s
recommendations. Finally, as argued by Elson and Ferrere (2012), the recommendation
derived from peer benchmarking is a single data point among many other factors. The
process of developing a compensation package for CEOs is a dynamic process. As the

board changes, the influence of the board on the compensation package also changes.
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Agency Theory. Agency theory argues that since CEOs do not own a majority of shares

in companies that they manage, the temptation to consume company resources for their
own benefit is very high (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since one of the duties of the board

of directors is to ratify and approve CEO compensation, CEOs have incentives to control
the board so they can determine the amount and method of their pay. Agency theorists

believe that CEOs are paid too much in non-incentive pay and not enough in incentive

based compensation. To remedy this, a board of directors is needed that is not affiliated
with the management (outsiders) and would like to maintain their current position and
reputation in the labor market (Fama, 1980). In this environment, CEOs need to align

their performance with shareholder expectations and demonstrate that they have
improved shareholder wealth.

Outsider-control boards can reduce agency costs by implementing compensation
plans that maximize shareholder wealth and remove unfit executives. One way outside
directors can align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders is by increasing the
incentive portion of the CEOs’ compensation packages. As a result, a restructuring of

CEO compensation would take place after the mandate. Thus, I hypothesize that pay-for-

performance sensitivity would increase in non-compliant firms following a change in

board composition.15
Managerial Power View. Under the managerial power view, CEOs have too much
influence over inside board members and, as a consequence, too much influence over

their own compensation packages (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997). Proponents of the
mandate believe that CEOs can extract rent from their firms as long as they do not invite

15 The null hypothesis is consistent with Romano’s window-dressing theory (2005)—no change will be
observed as a result of this mandate.
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the outrage of shareholders, involvement of activist investors, or hostile takeover
attempts by corporate raiders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). These compensation packages

have allowed management to secure generous monetary gains, even when their
company’s performance is deficient. Thus, the CEO compensation packages are often
excessive.

Bebchuk and Fried (2004) recommend that companies increase the monitoring

function of the board to reduce the influence of CEOs on their compensation and to
create remuneration packages that are reasonable. After the 2003 exchange mandate, the

presence of independent boards increased the monitoring function of boards. With the
elimination of insider-control boards, CEOs’ influence over boards was reduced. As a

result, total compensation decreased after the mandate.
Complementarity View. Under the complementarity view, as described by Fahlenbrach

(2009), governance mechanisms and pay-for-performance contracts complement one
another. Frydman and Jenter (2010) argue that the existing level of CEO pay is the result
of an equilibrium reached in the market of talented CEOs. Increasing pay-forperformance sensitivity reduces the value of the CEOs’ compensation package, since a

more incentive-based package reduces the CEOs’ ability to diversify their own wealth

(Core, et al., 2005; Murphy, 2013).
To illustrate this point, imagine a CEO is offered two choices for annual income.

Option 1 is $5 million in cash compensation today and $5 million in stock options
maturing at the end of the year with either a $0 or $10 million value. Option 2 is $0 in

cash compensation and $10 million in stock options maturing at the end of the year, with
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either a $0 or $20 million value. Thus, assuming no trading costs, no taxes, and no
inflation, the expected value of either choice is $10 million.

Even though the expected total value of compensation is $10 million for the CEO
and the cost to the company is $10 million in either scenario, the CEO prefers Option 1 to

Option 2 because, under Option 1, the CEO can take $5 million today and use it for his

preferred choice. If the CEO is a risk-taker, he or she can always go and buy the options
in the market. If the CEO is risk-averse, then he prefers to invest $5 million somewhere
else. Thus, the value that the CEO places in stock options is less than the guaranteed non
incentive income. As a result of greater pay-for-performance compensation, the CEO has

become less diversified and more restricted with regard to choices concerning his wealth.
To compensate the CEO for bearing additional risks, the outside board will also

concurrently increase total compensation when switching to compensation plans with

greater pay-for-performance sensitivity.

Almost 15 years have passed since companies converted to outsider-control
boards, and we still do not fully understand the impact of independent boards on total

CEO compensation. It is impossible to state a priori that total CEO compensation would

either increase or decrease following a move toward more incentive-based compensation.

As mentioned above, there is evidence to support both sides of the debate regarding the
effect on total CEO compensation. The second hypothesis addresses the impact of the

mandate on the total CEO compensation of non-compliant firms.

Data & Variables
Data & Endogeneity. The data for this study is extracted from three sources. Information
regarding CEO compensation for S&P 1500 firms is extracted from ExecuComp for
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1996-2012. Information regarding the board of directors comes from RiskMetrics which
tracked the records of S&P 1500 firms from 1996 to 2009. This information is matched

with the financial information of publicly traded firms in the United States, provided by
CompuStat from 1997 to 2012. I removed Apple, Inc. (formerly Apple Computers, Inc.)

and Fossil, Inc. from the data, as Guthrie, et al. (2012) have shown that these companies

biased the results of investigating CEO compensation during this time period. All data is

winsorized at the top and bottom percentiles.
Controlling for endogeneity is an important issue when studying the impact of

board composition (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). As pointed out by Graham, Li, and
Qiu (2012), omitted variable bias (a form of the endogeneity problem) must be

considered when studying CEO compensation. An omitted variable bias exists when an
unobservable characteristic affects the independent variable. I was able to avoid
endogeneity concerns by analyzing the results of a natural experiment, the exchange
mandate of 2003, on non-compliant firms against a control group—compliant firms

(Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010). If changes to board composition can be
attributed to unobservable CEO characteristics, then investigating the independence
mandate helps ease this concern.
Variables. The variables used in this study are defined as follows. Appendix A provides

more information about the variables.
Compensation Variables - Following the literature, Total Compensation is the sum of

all salaries, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock grants, and other compensation

awarded to the CEO during the fiscal year (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; Fahlenbrach,

2009; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Coles et al., 2014).
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For the first hypothesis, pay-for-performance sensitivity was measured as the change

in total compensation (△ Total Compensation) as a result of changes in the market
value of equity (similar to Hartzell & Starks, 2003). Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that

a compensation plan that varies the total pay when performance changes provides better
management incentives.
I define Cash Compensation as the sum of cash and bonus awarded to the CEO for

years prior to the disclosure requirement and the sum of cash, bonus, and non-equity

incentives awarded to the CEO for years after the new disclosure requirements (see
Appendix B). Equity Compensation is defined as the difference between total

compensation and cash compensation.
Board Independence and Mandate - Inside Board is a constant variable indicating the

compliant and non-compliant groups based on board composition prior to the board
independence mandate. It is defined as those firms that have a majority of inside directors

in 2000, similar to Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Duchin et al. (2010), and Guo et
al. (2015). The non-compliant (or treatment) firms consist of all firms that were insider-

controlled in 2000 and are affected by the exchange mandate. Firms that were already
outsider-controlled in 2000 and were not affected by the exchange mandate were

compliant (or control) firms. Specifically, the value for Inside Board is equal to 1 if the
ratio of inside directors to the total number of directors is equal to or greater than 0.5 at
the end of fiscal year 2000; the value is 0 if the ratio is less than 0.5.
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Post Regulation is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the year 2002 and beyond.16 Since

some companies preemptively changed board composition to outside boards in the

announcement year, I use the year 2002 as the event year (see Guo, et al. (2015)).

Control Variables - Adding control variables limits cross-sectional and time-series
variations. Firm-specific control variables include total sales, return on assets, and annual
return, similar to Jensen and Murphy (1990), Bebchuk and Fried (2005), Chhaochharia

and Grinstein (2009), Guthrie et al. (2012), and Coles et al. (2014). Total Sales is used to
measure firm size and is defined as the natural logarithm of total sales. I use the natural
log of return on assets (Return on Assets) and the natural log of annualized holding period

return (Annual Return) to control for firm performance. All control variables are lagged
by one year to avoid the endogeneity concern—the effect that compensation has on size

and performance.

Exogenous Shock. To visualize the exogenous shock on board composition, the median
percentage of outside directors for 1996-2009 is plotted in Figure 1. The dotted line

indicates compliant firms, and the solid line indicates non-compliant firms. Figure 1
indicates that there was a significant difference in board composition between the two
groups prior to 2000. For instance, in 2000, the median percentage of outsiders in an

insider-control firm was less than 40%; by 2009, this figure had increased to more than
70%. Firms compliant before the new regulation showed a more modest increase (from
65% to 75%, equivalent to adding one more independent director). The figure shows why

firms with outsider-control boards in the year 2000 are an obvious control group in the
DD estimation approach.

16 The results do not change if 1 is used for 2003 and beyond.
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Figure 1: Average Percentage of Outside Directors on Boards over Time

Figure 1: A time series plot of the median percentage of outside directors on the board
over time. An Insider-Controlled Board (Outsider-Controlled Board) is one that has (does
not have) a majority of inside directors in 2000.
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Propensity Score Matching. Similar to Guo et al. (2015), I also examined a subsample of
matched non-compliant and compliant firms to determine how similar firms that differed

in board independence prior to the mandate adjusted their CEO compensation packages
following the mandate. I employed propensity score matching with a one-to-one
replacement methodology, following Lu and Wang (2018).

To apply this strategy, I first estimated a logit model in which the dependent

variable is whether the firm had an insider-control board in the year 2000. Independent

variables include all continuous control variables (without lag), as well as firm and year
fixed effects. The logit model was estimated using data for 1997-2000, and the

estimation results are reported in Appendix C. A concordance rate was found of 73.6%,
well above the 50% rate associated with no predictive power.
Summary Statistics. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the entire sample as well as

for the matched sample. Panel A reports the results for the full sample of 1,113 publicly
traded firms with 14,424 annual observations. The average firm had total sales of $6.4
billion, a 3.77% average rate of return on assets, and an annual stock return of 15.10%.

The average annual total CEO compensation package was $5.5 million, of which $1.8
million consisted of cash compensation and the other $3 million of equity compensation.
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_______________________ Table 1: Summary Statistics_______________________
This table shows the summary statistics for all firms, firms with inside boards in year 2000, and
with independent board in year 2000. The statistics include total sales (in millions of dollars),
average return on assets (in percentage), and average holding period return (in percentage). The
table also includes the following compensation variables (all in 000s of dollars): total
compensation, cash compensation, and equity compensation. Panel A reports the results for the
full sample. Panel B presents the results for the matched sample of treatment and control firms.
All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. The information on the firm is
from fiscal years 1997-2012. Column 4 shows the t-statistics between Independent Board and
Inside Board clustered at firm level. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by
*, **, and ***, respectively.

Panel A—Full Sample

Number of Firms
Total Sales
(in million)
Return on Assets

Annual Return
Total Compensation
(in 000s)
Cash Compensation
(in 000s)
Equity
Compensation
(in 000s)

Number of Firms
Total Sales
(in million)
Return on Assets

Annual Return
Total Compensation
(in 000s)
Cash Compensation
(in 000s)
Equity
Compensation
(in 000s)

All
Firms
1113

Inside Board in
Year 2000
244

Independent Board
in Year 2000
869

TStatistics

$6,413

$3,692

$7,155

-3.80***

3.77%
15.10
%

4.36%

3.60%

1.68*

15.45%

15.00%

0.45

$5,488

$4,363

$5,794

-4.11***

$1,788

$1,545

$1,855

-3.56***

$3,701

$2,818

$3,940

-4.01***

Panel B—Matched Sample
All
Inside Board in Independent Board
Firms
Year 2000
in Year 2000
418
244
174

TStatistics

$3,714

$3,692

$3,744

-0.07

3.91%
15.47
%

4.36%

3.28%

0.49

15.45%

15.50%

0.97

$4,580

$4,363

$4,886

-1.33

$1,564

$1,545

$1,590

-0.45

$3,017

$2,818

$3,296

-1.50
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Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A separate the non-compliant and compliant firms,

respectively. Of the 1,113 firms, 244 had insider-control boards. On average, these firms
had total annual sales of $3.7 billion, a 4.36% return on assets, and a 15.45% annual
stock return. The average annual total CEO compensation package for these firms was

$4.4 million, which includes $1.5 million total cash compensation and $2.8 million equity
compensation. The other 869 firms had outsider-control boards. On average, these firms

had $7.2 billion in annual sales, a 3.6% return on assets, and a 15.5% annual stock return.
The average annual total CEO compensation package for these firms was $5.8 million,

which included $1.8 million in cash compensation and $3.9 million in equity
compensation.

As shown by the t-statistics in column 4 of Panel A, non-compliant firms are
smaller than compliant firms but experience a significantly greater return on assets than

outside-control firms do. During the same period, the annual stock returns for both

groups were similar. Although CEOs of non-compliant firms received less compensation,

a greater percentage of their package consisted of cash compensation (35% for noncompliant firms vs. 32% for compliant firms).

Panel B shows summary statistics for the matched sample. Using the predicted
values from the logit regression, a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching
methodology was applied, yielding a matched sample of 418 firms (244 firms with

insider-control boards and 174 firms with outsider-control boards).17 As can be seen from
column 4, there was no statistically significant difference between the treatment and
control firms, unlike in Panel A.

17 The reason for the lower number of control firms is because the one-to-one with replacement
methodology used here led to some control firms being selected for more than one treatment firm.
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_________________ Table 2: Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity_________________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the new
exchange regulations on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity for all firms for 1997-2012. The
dependent variable—Change in Total Compensation—is defined as the dollar change in total CEO
compensation to measure pay-for-performance sensitivity. Independent variables are described in
Appendix A. In Columns (3) & (4), propensity score matching is used to find firms that had similar
characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with one-to-one replacement. Following
Coles et al. (2014), the first year of the new pay disclosure requirements is removed for Columns (2) &
(4). All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year fixed
effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm
levels. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Change in Total
Compensation

Change in Total
Compensation

Change in Total
Compensation

Change in Total
Compensation

494.790**
(200.607)

572.858***
(214.318)

762.007***
(280.508)

864.519***
(299.095)

-1688.074***
(100.726)

-1676.386***
(110.436)

-1734.899***
(168.823)

-1714.502***
(178.974)

1341.822*
(760.956)

1537.248*
(827.045)

-557.805
(980.542)

-372.882
(1117.946)

32997.746***
(11885.685)

36751.580***
(12815.441)

20020.820
(17679.960)

25459.170
(18933.820)

A (Shareholder
Wealth)t-1

0.011
(0.009)

0.009
(0.009)

0.002
(0.014)

-0.003
(0.015)

Inside Board in
Year 2000 * Post
Regulation * A
(Shareholder
Wealth)t-1

0.123*
(0.065)

0.123**
(0.060)

0.141**
(0.067)

0.145**
(0.062)

Obs.

14424

12691

4317

R2

0.073
YES
YES
1113
494**

0.091

5290
0.094
YES
YES
418
761***

Inside Board *
Post Regulation

Ln (Total
Sales)t-1
Ln (Return on
Assets)t-1
Ln (Annual
Return)t-1

Firm Dummy

Year Dummy
Number of Firms
Total Effect

YES
YES
1112
572***
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0.114
YES
YES
418
863***

Pay-for-Performance Results

CEOs are smart investors and would prefer to minimize the pay-for-performance

sensitivity of their compensation packages and maximize their cash-based compensation.
Thus, CEOs can invest their cash in other places, as risky policies in the companies they

head might not only lead to dismissal but also cause the loss of their equity investment.
Jensen and Murphy (2010) recommend implementing a pay-for-performance plan that
aligns CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders. To confirm the hypothesis that

independent boards are better at implementing this plan and increasing pay-forperformance sensitivity, I investigated the impact of the change in shareholder wealth on

relative change in total CEO compensation in non-compliant firms by estimating the

following equation:

△ Total Compensation^ = x + ^1 (Inside Boards * Post Regulation^) +
[T (△Shareholder Wealtht-1) + P3 (△Shareholder Wealtht-1 * Inside Boards *

Post Regulationf) + 8t + Yt + rxi t + sit

(1)

In equation 1, the dependent variable is defined as the dollar change in the current

total CEO compensation from the previous year. As recommended by Graham et al.
(2012), I use firm-fixed effects (di) to control for unobservable cross-sectional factors
such as firm culture, CEO seniority, and current board composition. I also use year fixed

effects (K) to control for unobservable time-invariant factors. I cluster the standard errors

at the firm level. I also use robust and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Alpha
is the intercept term, which is suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap, similar to
Adams and Ferreira (2009), and epsilon is the error term.
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Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), I calculate Shareholder Wealth as shares

outstanding (in millions) times the fiscal year-end stock price (mean value = $9.1 billion).

Thus, a change in shareholder wealth (^Shareholder Wealth) is defined as the
variation in shareholder wealth from the previous to the current year. The mean value for

the change in shareholder wealth was -9.35. All other variables were defined previously.

The coefficient of the three-term interaction term, ^3, indicates the relative change
in the sensitivity of changes in total CEO compensation following the mandate to
changes in shareholder wealth for non-compliant firms. The coefficient of the two-term

interaction term, ^1, indicates the relative dollar change in total CEO compensation of

insider-control firms following the mandate through other measures, including but not
limited to cash compensation, pension payments, and restricted stock grants. The total

effect on these firms is given by adding the coefficients of P1 and the product of the mean
value of the change in shareholder wealth and ^3.
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the results of equation 1. The coefficient of the

three-term interaction, ^Shareholder Wealtht-1 * Inside Boards *

Post Regulation is significant and positive, indicating that incentive-based
compensation increased for non-compliant firms’ CEOs following the mandate. This
result differs from the short-term results of Chung and John (2017), who find that outside

directors do not change the incentive pay following the mandate. The lack of significance

in their study can be attributed to the shorter time frame of their analysis. The results here
indicate that a long-term analysis may find a different impact of the mandate on CEO
pay-for-performance sensitivity. In terms of economic significance, for an average CEO,

a new independent board is associated with a greater than 12% increase in the sensitivity
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of changes in total compensation to changes in shareholder wealth relative to compliant
firms following the mandate. For every $1 million change in shareholder wealth for non-

compliant firms, there is a change in total CEO compensation of $472 relative to
compliant firms based on the information provided in column 1.
In 2004, the Fair Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published FAS 123R,
requiring firms to expense options awarded differently than before. Additionally, the SEC

mandated expanded disclosure guidelines for executive compensation at the same time.

The majority of the companies switched to the new format in 2006, and the remaining
companies did so in 2007 (see Appendix B). To deal with this issue, Coles et al. (2014)

suggest removing the first year when firms switched to new reporting standards from the
analysis of changes in total compensation. Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results. By
removing these observations, the coefficient of the three-term interaction is the same, but

has greater significance. This result indicates that changes in disclosure requirements

cannot explain the increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity of non-compliant firms’
CEOs following the mandate.
Propensity Score Matching. The model employed here assumes that firms that had to
change their board composition to comply with the mandate are similar to firms that did
not have to change their board composition. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, this is not

the case. Even if these variables are controlled in the full sample, doing so may not fully

address endogeneity concerns. To address this issue, I employed one-to-one propensity
score matching with replacement in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.

Column 3 of Table 2 re-estimates equation 1 using this sample. The interaction
term ^Shareholder Wealtht-1 * Inside Boards * Post Regulationt is still positive
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and statistically significant, suggesting that new independent boards increase the CEO
pay-for-performance sensitivity of non-compliant firms. Similar to column 2, I also

controlled for the new pay disclosure requirements in column 4, finding qualitatively

similar results. The results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that the full sample results
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 are not due to differences between the compliant

and non-compliant groups.
In summary, the results in Table 2 indicate that CEO pay-for-performance

sensitivity in non-compliant firms increased following the mandate. The next hypothesis
examines the impact of this increase on total CEO compensation.

Total Compensation Results
The second purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the independence
mandate on the total CEO compensation of non-compliant firms over the long run. I used

a difference-in-difference (DD) estimation method, similar to that used in Chhaochharia
and Grinstein (2009), Duchin et al. (2010), Guo, Lach, and Mobbs (2015), Chung and
John (2017), and Lu and Wang (2018), which approximates the result of the natural

experiment and compares it to the control group.18
I start by providing a visual summary of the total CEO compensation in non-

compliant firms. I followed Autor, Donohue III, and Schwab (2006) and Acharya,
Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) in constructing this graph. The graph plots the point

estimates and the 95% confidence interval for lambda (!) from the following equation:

18 Additionally, the affected firms were given a couple of years to comply with the mandate. I assume,
similar to Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guo et al. (2015), that other policy shocks, including
SOX, during that time had similar impacts on the sample firms and the control firms. Furthermore, there
were no shocks at the time that affected firms with only inside-controlled boards (Chhaochharia &
Grinstein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007).
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Ln (Total Compensation)it = 6t + Yt + 22=1996 ^t (Yt * Inside Boards) +
^n.

(2)
The dependent variable is the natural log of total compensation. By taking the

natural log, a one-unit change in the independent variable indicates the effect it has on the
percentage change in total CEO compensation. Delta (6) and upsilon (Y) are,

respectively, vectors of firm and year dummies to control for cross-sectional dependency
and time-specific variation. Inside Board is a dummy that assumes a value of 1 if the firm

had an insider-control board in the year 2000 (non-compliant firms). Errors are clustered

at the firm level. Conceptually, this equation removes the variation caused by unobserved
firm characteristics as well as economy-wide shocks by running the regression with firm
and year fixed effects and keeping the residuals.

Even without the control variables, Figure 2 provides initial evidence that CEO
compensation increased for insider-control firms following the mandate.19 Specifically, if
there is no treatment effect, the difference between CEO compensation for non-compliant
firms and compliant firms would be the same over time. As seen in Figure 2, this was not
the case, and one can notice an increase in compensation for insider-control firms

following the mandate. The F-statistic for the post-mandate (years 2003-2012) joint test

is 1.76, which is statistically significant (p-value = 0.04).20 To confirm the results
presented in Figure 2, I estimated the regression analysis of total compensation over the

19 The wide confidence level bands caution against making strong inferences from this figure. However,
this equation does not include the control variables. At the same time, the univariate and multiple
regression analyses of total compensation performed next suggest results similar to those given by the
figure.
20 Additionally, the point estimate line in Figure 2 being close to zero prior to the mandate tests for the
parallel trend assumption. The F-statistic for the pre-mandate (years 1997-2002) joint test of significance is
1.46 and is not significant at traditional levels (p-value = 0.23), suggesting that the difference-in-difference
approach would be appropriate.
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long run. Table 3 reports the result of performing univariate difference-in-difference tests
on total CEO compensation between the compliant firms and non-compliant firms prior
to and after the 2002 board independence mandate.

Panel A of Table 3 reports the results for the full sample. Total CEO
compensation increased for all firms following the mandate, possibly reflecting the time
trend. The difference-in-difference estimator is positive and significant (0.34), indicating

that the relative total CEO compensation for non-compliant firms increased following a

change in board composition. This result differs from the short-term results of

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie et al. (2012), indicating that a long-term
analysis may indicate a different impact of the mandate on CEO compensation. Using the
matched sample in Panel B, the DD estimator is positive at a 5% significance level. The

changes observed in total CEO compensation support the complementarity view that a

new independent board will increase total CEO compensation concurrently with pay-forperformance sensitivity to reimburse CEOs for bearing greater firm-specific risks.
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Figure 2: CEO Compensation of Insider-Controlled Firms over Time

Figure 2: This figure shows a visual difference-in-differences analysis examining the
effect of the passage of the 2003 board independence mandate on CEO Compensation in
traditionally insider-control firms to compliant firms. On the y-axis, the graph plots the
natural log of total compensation; the x-axis shows time (ranging from 5 years prior to
adoption until 10 years after the passage). The vertical line (for 2002) indicates the year
when the mandate was announced. The dashed lines in the figure correspond to the 95%
confidence intervals based on standard errors that are clustered at firm levels.
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Table 3: Univariate DD—Total Compensation
The following table shows univariate difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the new
exchange regulations on the natural log of total CEO compensation for 1997-2012. Total
compensation is defined as the sum of all salary, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock grants,
and other compensation awarded to the CEO during the fiscal year. Panel A reports the results
for the full sample. Panel B presents the results for the matched sample of treatment and
control firms. Statistical significance for the difference-in-difference estimate at 10%, 5%, and
1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Panel A —Full Sample
Pre-Mandate
Post-Mandate

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Difference

7.899

8.263

0.364

7.564

8.019

0.455

-0.335
-0.245
Panel B—Matched Sample
Pre-Mandate
Post-Mandate

0.090**
Difference

7.829

8.083

0.349

7.564

8.019

0.455

-0.264

-0.064

0.200***
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____________ Table 4: Multivariate DD—Total CEO Compensation____________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the
new exchange regulations on total CEO compensation of all firms for 1997-2012 using
difference-in-difference estimates. The dependent variable—Total Compensation—is defined
as the natural log of total CEO compensation. Independent variables are described in Appendix
A. Column (1) shows the main results of the analysis. Column (2) repeats the primary analysis
by collapsing the data into two cross-sectional averages: one pre-mandate and one post
mandate. In column (3), propensity score matching is used to find firms that had similar
characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with one-to-one replacement.
Column (4) presents the results where the main independent variable—Inside Board—is
defined as firms having insider-control boards for two consecutive years prior to the year 2003.
All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year
fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent and
clustered at firm levels. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap.
Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively._______

Inside Board in Year
2000 * Post Regulation
Inside Board in 2
Consecutive Years Prior
to 2003 * Post
Regulation
Ln (Total Sales)t-1

(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Collapsed
Time
Series

(3)
Matched
Sample

0.076*
(0.045)

0.080*
(0.046)

0.154**
(0.060)

(4)
Alternative
Definition
for Inside
Board

0.085**
(0.037)

0.074***
(0.012)

0.181***
(0.029)

0.076***
(0.021)

0.077***
(0.010)

Ln (Return on
Assets)t-1

0.443***
(0.084)

1.265***
(0.315)

0.421***
(0.149)

0.449***
(0.081)

Ln (Annual Return)t-1

16.179***
(1.318)

34.419***
(6.482)

15.483***
(2.031)

15.440***
(1.227)

Obs.
R2

14424
0.698

2226
0.897

5297
0.6627

16747
0.696

Firm Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of Firms

1113

1113

418

1283
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Further analyses, including multiple regression analysis, will help to determine

whether the changes in total CEO compensation are significant for all firms. To confirm
the univariate results shown in Figure 2 and Table 3, the following multivariate DD

equation was estimated:

Ln (Total Compensation)it = x + @1 (Inside Boards *
Post Regulation^) + rXj,t + 5, + Yt + sit

(3)

The interaction variable, Inside Board * Post Regulation, is the DD estimator that
indicates the relative change in CEO compensation for non-compliant firms. This

estimator can be seen as taking the difference between the treatment and control groups

and subtracting the post-regulation effect from the treatment group to obtain the
coefficient Pi. In other words, the interaction term measures the effect of the mandate on
non-compliant firms following the regulation by capturing the difference between actual
CEO compensation for non-compliant firms and the same firms if there was no treatment

following the mandate. The coefficients on both Inside Board and Post Regulation are
absorbed by firm (di) and year ( K) fixed effects, respectively. Again, the intercept was
suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap.

Table 4 displays the multivariate DD analysis of the total compensation. Column
1 shows the regression analysis for the effects of the forced change to outsider-control
boards on total CEO compensation during the period 1997-2012 using difference-in

difference estimates. The interactive coefficient for Inside Board * Post Regulation is
positive and significant (0.076), indicating that overall compensation increases for CEOs
of insider-control firms. Specifically, there is a relative 7.6% increase (though only

weakly significant) in the compensation of non-compliant firms as a result of this
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mandate. This result is consistent with the complementarity argument that incumbent

CEOs at insider-control firms receive more compensation as a result of the new

independent board. All control variables (Total Sales, Return on Assets, and Annual
Return) show a positive association with total compensation, which is consistent with
prior literature.

To confirm this result, several tests were performed. First, I collapsed the panel

data into two cross-sectional pieces of data. Second, I used a matched sample of similar

compliant and non-compliant firms. Finally, I changed the definition used to separate
firms into compliant and non-compliant groups.
Alternate Methodology. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) found that
significance levels can be seriously overestimated if the dependent variable is serially

correlated. To mitigate this concern, I followed Guo et al. (2015) and collapsed the data

into two cross sections: one pre-event cross section containing the average of all variables
from the pre-event data, and one post-event cross section containing the average of all

variables from the post-event data. I re-estimated equation 3 using this data in column 2

of Table 4 and found qualitatively similar results. Specifically, following the mandate of
2003, CEO compensation increased in firms that had to change their board composition
to comply with the mandate.

Propensity Score Matching. Control variables may not be able to capture all the
differences between compliant and non-compliant firms. Along with using control

variables, column 3 of Table 4 estimates equation 2 for the matched sample created by
the propensity score methodology used in the previous section. The interaction term,

Inside Board * Post Regulation, is still positive and statistically significant, suggesting

101

that the new independent board increases relative total CEO compensation in non-

compliant firms following the mandate. As a robustness check, I employed propensity
score matching with one-to-one without replacement methodology and two-to-one

without replacement methodology. The results for the total compensation using these
methods are presented in Appendix D.21

Alternative Definition for the Independent Variable. Column 4 of Table 4 shows the

result for the robustness of the independent variable by using a different definition to sort
firms into compliant and non-compliant groups. I changed the definition of Inside Board
to firms that had an insider-control board for two consecutive years prior to 2003.

Specifically, the value for Inside Board is 1 if the ratio of outside directors to total
directors was less than 0.5 for any two consecutive years between 1996 and 2002. The
second definition yielded 1,283 firms to test the hypothesis that relative total CEO

compensation increases for non-compliant firms following the mandate. The result for the
DD variable is qualitatively similar to the main results in column 1.
In summary, the results in Table 4 indicate that total CEO compensation for non-

compliant firms increased relative to total CEO compensation for compliant firms

following the board independence mandate in the long run. This result has not been
documented previously in the literature.

21 Results for other tests are available upon request.
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_______ Table 5: Total CEO Compensation—Additional Robustness Tests_______
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of
the new exchange regulations on total CEO compensation of all firms for 1997-2012 using
difference-in-difference estimates. The dependent variable—Total Compensation—is
defined as the natural log of total CEO compensation. Independent variables are described
in Appendix A. In column (1), New Format controls for changes in new pay reporting
requirements in ExecuComp based on FAS 123R and SEC expanded disclosure mandate.
In column (2), only data from 1996-2003 are used and the False Post Regulation Period
starts from 2000. In column (3), CEO Replaced controls for signing bonuses awarded to
new CEOs. In column (4), Industry x Year FE is added to control for CEO demand and
supply for a particular industry in a particular year. All variables are winsorized at the top
and bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors
reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm levels.
Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively._________________________
(1)
Ln (Total
Compensation)

Inside Board * Post
Regulation

(2)
Ln (Total
Compensation)

0.077*
(0.045)

(3)
Ln (Total
Compensation)

(4)
Ln (Total
Compensation)

0.060*
(0.035)

0.110**
(0.046)

Ln (Return on
Assets)t-1

0.074***
(0.012)
0.444***
(0.084)

0.012
(0.011)
0.394***
(0.133)

0.081***
(0.012)
0.426***
(0.085)

0.063***
(0.012)
0.418***
(0.088)

Ln (Annual
Return)t-1

16.212***
(1.318)

15.304***
(1.834)

16.358***
(1.334)

13.835***
(1.416)

New Format

0.144***
(0.048)

Ln (Total Sales)t-1

Inside Board in Year
2000 * False Post
Regulation

-0.111
(0.147)

CEO Replaced

0.030
(0.024)

Industry x Year FE

YES

0.698

6264
0.756

14424
0.699

14424
0.721

YES
YES
1113

YES
YES
1113

YES
YES
1106

YES
YES
1113

Obs.

14424

R2
Firm Dummy
Year Dummy
Number of Firms
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Robustness Tests
Additional robustness tests are performed to confirm the total CEO compensation

results. Factors other than the independence mandate may have caused an increase in
CEO compensation. These factors include the new compensation reporting format,

controlling for previous mandates, CEO replacement decisions, and industry effects. The
results are presented in Table 5.
New Reporting Standards. As explained in Appendix B, new pay disclosure

requirements might have resulted in ExecuComp, one of the databases used in this study,
reporting increases in compensation even if the actual compensation was unchanged.

ExecuComp formally adopted the new standards when companies started reporting them.
To control for these changes in reporting, I added a dummy variable (New Format) to

equation 3, beginning with the year when a particular firm started using these standards.
The results are presented in column 1 of Table 5. Even though the new variable is
statistically significant, the DD variable still shows a (weakly) significant sign, indicating
that the new disclosure requirements do not confound the primary results that CEO

compensation of insider-control firms increased following the mandate.
Falsification Tests. Duchin et al. (2010) argue that the board independence mandate is
the sum of all corporate governance measures imposed by the exchanges since 1999. If
that is the case, then we would expect to see the effect on CEO compensation prior to the

mandate year. I thus selected the year 2000, two years prior to the actual event year 2002,
as the hypothetical event year. Column 2 estimates equation 1 on pre-event years to

demonstrate that there was no event prior to the mandate that could account for a change
in CEO compensation other than the mandate that passed in 2003. As expected, the
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interaction variable is not statistically significant for total compensation, suggesting that
the observed change in relative CEO compensation is the result of the board
independence mandate and not the result of prior mandates.

Two cautions are warranted when interpreting this result. First, the null

hypothesis for this test is whether the pre-event trend is zero. The falsification test failed
to reject the null hypothesis. This does not prove causality that board independence

caused changes in total CEO compensation. Second, the low number of years available to

perform the falsification test (1997-2003) led to noise in the data, which might have
prevented detection of violations of a parallel trend when there is one and can lead to

over-rejection of the null hypothesis in the full sample (Kahn-Lang & Lang, 2018; Roth

2020). Nonetheless, this falsification test plays an important role in validating the parallel
trends assumption underlying the DD methodology.
CEO Replacement. To attract highly talented and well-sought-after CEOs, companies
routinely give out extravagant signing bonuses, which are included in the total

compensation reported for the first year when the new CEO is hired. To control for these
signing bonuses, I add a dummy variable for years in which the CEO is replaced. The

results, presented in column 3 of Table 5, show that the DD variable is still positive and
significant, suggesting that even after controlling for CEO replacement decisions, relative
total CEO compensation for non-compliant firms still increased following the mandate

compared to compliant firms.
Industry Effects. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) argue that CEO compensation for a
particular industry depends on the supply and demand factors associated with that

industry in a particular year. For instance, the demand for CEOs able to manage a new
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economy firm was higher in the 1990s, encouraging high levels of pay during that decade

in that particular industry. Following the dot-com burst in early 2000, the demand fell and
the supply of those CEOs increased, putting downward pressure on their compensation.
To control for these supply and demand factors, I follow Chhaochharia and

Grinstein (2009) by including Fama and French’s 49 industry classifications multiplied
by year dummies in equation 1. The results are presented in column 4 of Table 5.22 Even

after controlling for industry shocks affecting different industries in different years, the
DD variable is still positive and significant, suggesting that industry shocks cannot

explain the relative increase in CEO compensation for non-compliant firms following the
mandate.

Cash & Equity Compensation
The results in Table 2 indicate that along with pay-for-performance sensitivity,

other forms of CEO compensation also increased for non-compliant firms following the
board independence mandate. The interactive term Inside Board * Post Regulation in

Table 2 is positive and significant across all four columns, suggesting that increasing
CEO incentives require the board to concurrently increase other forms of compensation

to encourage the CEO to take additional risks. This increase includes, but is not limited
to, cash compensation, pension payments, and restricted stock grants.

It is imperative to check whether the increase in total compensation mentioned
above occurred via cash compensation or equity compensation. Jensen and Murphy

(2010) argued that cash compensation can misalign CEOs’ interests with respect to those

of shareholders. There could be an argument that if the increase is through cash

22 For reasons of brevity, individual interactions of industry multiplied by year dummies are not shown.

106

compensation, then this is not a sign of a strong board but rather of the bargaining power

of an entrenched CEO. The complementarity view predicts that the increase in total
compensation was due to strong governance mechanisms resulting from the independent
board. Thus, we expect that the increase in total compensation was through equity

compensation.
To explore this hypothesis, I defined total cash compensation as the sum of cash

and bonus for years prior to the new disclosure requirement and the sum of cash, bonus,
and non-equity incentives for years after the new disclosure requirement (see Appendix
B). Equity compensation is the difference between the total compensation and cash
compensation.

Table 6 shows the results of the univariate DD analysis for cash compensation
using both the full sample (Panel A) and the matched sample (Panel B). The results

indicate that there is no change in relative cash compensation for non-compliant firms

following the mandate. To further confirm these results, I changed the dependent variable

in equation 3 to the natural log of cash compensation.
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Table 6: Univariate DD—Cash Compensation
The following table shows univariate difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the new
exchange regulations on the natural log of the cash compensation of the CEO compensation
package for all firms for 1997-2012. Cash Compensation is defined as the sum of salary,
bonus, and (for years with new reporting standards) annual cash incentives. Panel A reports the
results for the full sample. Panel B presents the results for the matched sample of treatment and
control firms. Statistical significance for the difference-in-difference estimate at 10%, 5%, and
1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Panel A—Full Sample
Pre-Mandate
Post-Mandate
6.902
7.343

7.199

6.721

0.181
-0.144
Panel B—Matched Sample
Pre-Mandate
Post-Mandate
6.809
7.203

Difference
0.441
0.478

0.037
Difference
0.394

6.721

7.199

0.478

-0.088

-0.004

0.084

The multivariate DD analyses for cash compensation are presented in Table 7.
The results for the full sample are shown in column 1 of Table 7. The results indicate no
change in the relative cash compensation for CEOs of non-compliant firms following the
mandate. I also confirmed these results by removing the observations for the first year
when companies started reporting compensation following the new reporting standards.

Column 2 presents the results. I also used the matched sample created using the
propensity score methodology in column 3. In column 4, along with using the matched

sample, I also controlled for the new pay disclosure standards. The results are

qualitatively similar to those of column 1. The results in Table 7 indicate that following
the board independence mandate, non-compliant firms did not increase cash

compensation.
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Table 7: Multivariate DD—Cash Compensation
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effect of the new
exchange regulations n the cash component of the CEO compensation package for all firms for
1997-2012 using difference-in-difference estimates. The dependent variable in all four
columns—Cash Compensation—is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, and (for years with new
reporting standards) annual cash incentives to measure cash compensation. Independent
variables are described in Appendix A. In Columns (3) & (4), propensity score matching is used
to find firms that have similar characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with
one-to-one replacement. Following Coles et al. (2014), the first year of the new pay disclosure
requirements is removed for Columns (2) & (4). All variables are winsorized at the top and
bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm levels. Intercept has been
suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

(1)
Ln (Cash
Compensation)
0.044
(0.034)

(2)
Ln (Cash
Compensation)
0.048
(0.035)

(3)
Ln (Cash
Compensation)
0.090
(0.073)

(4)
Ln (Cash
Compensation)
0.100
(0.082)

Ln (Total
Sales)t-1

0.041***
(0.009)

0.040***
(0.009)

0.016
(0.015)

0.015
(0.015)

Ln
(Return on
Assets)t-1

0.311***
(0.069)

0.339***
(0.073)

0.396***
(0.112)

0.395***
(0.121)

Ln
(Annual
Return)t-1

10.861***
(0.979)

9.902***
(0.995)

10.057***
(1.333)

9.245***
(1.400)

Obs.

14424

12691

5297

4672

R2

0.669

0.666

0.656

0.656

Firm
Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year
Dummy
Number of
Firms

YES

YES

YES

YES

1113

1112

418

418

Inside
Board *
Post
Regulation
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Table 8: Univariate DD—Equity Compensation
The following table shows univariate difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the new
exchange regulations on the natural log of the equity component of the CEO compensation
package for all firms for 1997-2012. Equity compensation is defined as the difference between
total compensation and cash compensation. Panel A reports the results for the full sample.
Panel B presents the results for the matched sample of treatment and control firms. Statistical
significance for the difference-in-difference estimate at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **,
and ***, respectively.

Panel A—Full Sample

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Pre-Mandate

Post-Mandate

Difference

6.857

7.317

0.460

6.274

6.864

0.590

-0.583

-0.453

0.130*

Panel B— Matched Sample

Compliant Firms
Non-Compliant
Firms
Difference

Pre-Mandate

Post-Mandate

Difference

6.711

7.010

0.299

6.274

6.864

0.590

-0.437

-0.146

0.291**

Table 8 shows the results of the univariate DD analysis for equity compensation
using both the full sample (Panel A) and the matched sample (Panel B). The results

indicate that the new independent board increased equity compensation for CEOs in non-

compliant firms following the mandate. To further confirm these results, I changed the

dependent variable in equation 3 to the natural log of equity compensation.
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______________ Table 9: Multivariate DD—Equity Compensation______________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effect of the new
exchange regulations on the cash component of the CEO compensation package for all firms for
1997-2012 using difference-in-difference estimates. The dependent variable—Equity
Compensation—is defined as the difference between total compensation and cash
compensation. The independent variables are described in Appendix A. In Columns (3) & (4),
propensity score matching is used to find firms that had similar characteristics based on the
nearest neighbor methodology with replacement. Following Coles et al. (2014), the first year of
the new pay disclosure requirements is removed for Columns (2) & (4). All variables are
winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm
levels. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

(1)
Ln (Equity
Compensatio
n)
0.088*
(0.053)

(2)
Ln (Equity
Compensatio
n)
0.102*
(0.062)

(3)
Ln (Equity
Compensatio
n)
0.193*
(0.116)

(4)
Ln (Equity
Compensatio
n)
0.192*
(0.108)

Ln (Total Sales)t-1

0.041***
(0.009)

0.102***
(0.025)

0.129
(0.041)

0.123
(0.047)

Ln (Return on
Assets)t-1

0.102***
(0.249)

0.789***
(0.201)

0.792**
(0.331)

0.814**
(0.349)

Ln (Annual
Return)t-1

17.512***
(2.832)

16.941***
(2.955)

12.242**
(4.837)

11.217**
(5.052)

Obs.

14424

12691

5297

4672

R2

0.544

0.548

0.502

0.505

Firm Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year Dummy

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of Firms

1113

1112

418

418

Inside Board *
Post Regulation
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The multivariate DD analyses for equity compensation are presented in Table 9.
The results for the full sample are shown in column 1 of Table 9. I also confirmed these
by controlling for new reporting standards. Column 2 presents the results. I also used the
matched sample in column 3, while in column 4, along with using the matched sample, I

also controlled for the new pay disclosure standards. The results are qualitatively similar

to those of column 1. The results in Table 9 indicate that following the board
independence mandate, boards of non-compliant firms increased total CEO compensation

through additional equity compensation.
The results indicate that relative equity compensation for CEOs of non-compliant

firms increased following the mandate, which is consistent with the complementarity

view. The new independent board increased the total compensation along with CEO payfor-performance sensitivity. However, the increase in total compensation is due to an
increase in equity compensation. Thus, outside boards do not consider a strong

governance mechanism a substitute for incentive pay. Consistent with the
complementarity view, independent boards increased equity compensation when

enforcing strong governance mechanisms.
Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the impact of changes in board composition on CEO

compensation as a result of the exchange listed mandate of 2003. The general results
indicate that total compensation increased following an increase in CEO pay-for-

performance sensitivity over the long run for non-compliant firms compared to compliant

firms. This increase in total CEO compensation did not come through cash compensation,
but through equity compensation. These results are inconsistent with the short-run results
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found by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie et al. (2012), but are consistent
with the expectations of the complementarity view.

There are two potential avenues for future research. First, it is imperative to
analyze the behavior of boards when negotiating pay with CEOs. CEO pay is usually the

largest remuneration paid by any corporation. If CEO pay is misaligned with

shareholders’ interests and, concurrently, has increased many-fold over the last two
decades (see Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005), the obvious question is why the independent

board focuses mainly on controlling the first problem (i.e., aligning CEOs’ interests with
those of shareholders by increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity). One could argue
that independent boards are taking the easy way out by focusing on the alignment of

shareholders’ interests with those of CEOs and not on reducing compensation, since
outside directors do not want to create a bad working environment with CEOs by
reducing their compensation. Further research could focus on this behavior and decision

making by independent boards.
Second, future research could also examine how the exchange mandate affected

CEOs in other ways, such as the impact on CEO ownership. How do CEOs deal with

additional stock options awarded as a result of an increase in pay-for-performance
sensitivity? Chung and John (2017) suggest that in the short term, CEOs reduce their
personal holdings. However, a long-term study is needed to analyze CEO behavior.

Additionally, the agency implication of that decision will shed light on whether
shareholders consider strong governance a substitute for stock holdings.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions

Variable
Annual Return

Cash
Compensation
CEO Replaced
Change in
Shareholder
Wealth
Change in Total
Compensation
Equity
Compensation
Extraordinary
Income

Inside Board
New Format

Post Regulation
Return on Assets

Source

Definition
Annualized holding period return during the fiscal
CompuStat
year
Sum of Salary, Bonus, and (for years when
ExecuComp ExecuComp reported under new disclosure rules)
Non-Equity Incentives
ExecuComp 1 if CEO was replaced during that fiscal year
The dollar change calculated as the fiscal year end
CompuStat stock price times shares outstanding (in millions)
from previous year to the current year
Difference between current Total Compensation
ExecuComp
and last year’s Total Compensation

ExecuComp

Total Compensation - Cash Compensation

Net income before extraordinary items at the end of
the year
1 if the firm has inside board in the year 2000
Risk
(percentage of outsiders has to be less than 50%)
Metrics
1 if ExecuComp reported compensation based on
ExecuComp FAS 123R and expanded SEC guidelines on
reporting pay
Denotes 1 for the years 2002 and beyond following
the announcement of new exchange-listed
requirements
CompuStat Extraordinary Income / Total Assets
CompuStat

Shares
Outstanding

CompuStat

Stock Price

CompuStat

Total
Compensation

ExecuComp

Total Sales

CompuStat

Net number of all common shares outstanding at
year end (in millions)

Fiscal year-end price for a company’s stock
The value listed under the variable tdc1 in the
ExecuComp database
Net sales at the end of the year
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Appendix B: Pay Disclosure Changes

One of the main changes in pay disclosure mandates by FASB 123R relates to

options and restricted stock awards. Specifically, firms are required to expense options at
fair market value following the disclosure mandate. Since firms were not required to
disclose expense option awards before, ExecuComp calculated options based on their

Black-Scholes calculation. Post the disclosure mandate, ExecuComp started recording
options as reported by the firm (which may not be based on the Black-Scholes formula).

Thus, the traditional calculation of pay-for-performance measures using equity

compensation used in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), Guthrie et al. (2012), and
Graham et al. (2012) are not comparable to the updated measures following the
disclosure mandate (See Coles et al. (2014) for detailed explanation of the pay reporting

changes). As shown by Murphy (2013), following these disclosure requirements,
companies limited the use of broad-based option plans.

Along with FASB 123R, the SEC also required firms to disclose expanded

compensation information related to incentive and non-incentive-based compensation.
Thus, ExecuComp changed how they report incentive-based cash compensation.

Specifically, cash-based payments from formulaic plans are combined post-disclosure
mandate compared to previous reporting standards when ExecuComp separated the

annual cash-based incentive payments from multiyear cash-based incentive payments.
Thus, the traditional calculation of cash compensation using the sum of cash and bonus

used in Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Graham et al. (2012) is not comparable to the
updated measures following the disclosure mandate without some assumptions. To

compare the cash compensation measures before and after the disclosure mandate, I
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assume that multiyear formulaic cash payments were zero for all firms. This is not a bad

assumption when one considers that most CEO contracts are renewed every three years

and most incentive plans are based on stock options and restricted stock grants.23

23 Nonetheless, I caution readers not to draw strong inferences from the results presented in Tables 6-9.
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Appendix C: Propensity Score Model
The following table reports the coefficient estimates of the logit model used to predict a firm
having an insider-control board in the year 2000. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm has
majority of insiders as board of directors in the year 2000 and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable and the independent variables are described in Appendix A. The sample consists of all
firm years from 1997-2000. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All
regressions use firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm levels. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid
the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and
***, respectively.______________________________________________________________

Variables

Probability of Inside Board

-0.293***
Ln (Total Sales)

(0.032)

0.879*
Ln (ROA)
(0.449)

-5.310
Ln (Annual Return)

(6.564)

Percent Concordant

73.7%

Chi Square

982.76

Firm Dummy

YES

Year Dummy

YES

Number of
Observations

4101
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__________ Appendix D: Robustness PSM—Total CEO Compensation__________
The following table shows the results of least square regression analysis of the effects of the
new exchange regulations on total CEO compensation of all firms for 1997-2012 using
difference-in-difference estimates. The dependent variable—Total Compensation—is defined
as the natural log of total CEO compensation. Independent variables are described in Appendix
A. In column (1), propensity score matching is used to find firms that had similar
characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with one-to-one without
replacement. In column (2), propensity score matching is used to find firms that had similar
characteristics based on the nearest neighbor methodology with two-to-one without
replacement: For every non-compliant firm, I use two compliant firms. All variables are
winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. All regressions use firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at firm
levels. Intercept has been suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

(1)
1-to-1 PSM w/o
Replacement

(3)
2-to-1 PSM w/o
Replacement

0.128*
(0.053)

0.097*
(0.047)

Ln (Total Sales)t-1

0.088***
(0.019)

0.086***
(0.015)

Ln (Return on Assets)t-1

0.455***
(0.100)

0.363***
(0.096)

Ln (Annual Return)t-1

17.604***
(1.808)

16.665***
(1.508)

R2

6190
0.692

9349
0.683

Firm Dummy

YES

YES

Year Dummy

YES

YES

Number of Firms

488

732

Inside Board in Year
2000 * Post Regulation

Obs.
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